NOTES

1 Cf. Schuller and Rahden (eds.): *Die andere Kraft: Zur Renaissance des Bösen*. In these notes, the sources are cited by the author's last name, the work's title and the page number. For a more complete citation, see the biography at the end of the book.

2 This is a notable trend in the titles of several anthologies that have come out in the last few years. For instance, Häring and Tracy (eds.): *The Fascination of Evil* and Liessmann (ed.): *Faszination des Bösen: Über die Abgründe des Menschlichen*.

3 This is obviously nothing new, and our present fascination with evil clearly has its roots in the Romantic. For more on this subject, see Davenport: *Gothic: 400 Years of Excess, Horror, Evil and Ruin*; Gillespie: *Nihilism Before Nietzsche*, especially chapter 4; Russell: *Mephistopheles*, especially chap. 5; Bohrer: *Nach der Natur*.

4 Weil: *Gravity and Grace*, p. 70.

5 Oscar Wilde writes about how art expresses reality—that is, life—but in a tame form that prevents us from hurting ourselves. Therefore we must turn to art—not life—for all our adventures and experiences: "Because Art does not hurt us. The tears we shed at a play are a type of the exquisite sterile emotions that it is the function of Art to awaken. We weep, but we are not wounded . . . But the sorrow with which Art fills us both purifies and initiates . . . [It] is through Art, and through Art only, that we can shield ourselves from the sordid perils of actual existence" (Wilde: *Complete Works*, p. 173). Art, therefore, becomes a defense against life's burdens, and

aestheticism becomes *escapism*. In my opinion, this describes *all* aestheticism—and Wilde himself develops a critique against such aestheticism in his later works, especially *The Picture of Dorian Gray* and *De profundis*.

6 The term "sadism" is used in this book in association with abuse, not consensual sexual intercourse.

7 Cited in Masters: *The Evil That Men Do*, p. 179.

8 For example, I was unable to cover Schelling's speculative theory about evil in his work *Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom* from 1809. In my opinion, Schelling's discussion is one of the most difficult works in the history of philosophy, and even a short paraphrase would have taken up too much space. Nor I have devoted much space to psychoanalytical theory. (For an excellent study of evil within a psychoanalytical framework, see Alford: *What Evil Means to Us*.) The main reason for this is that I'm skeptical of psychoanalytical theories in general—but this is not the place for a systematic outline of what I perceive to be the weaker points of the field.

9 For those who are interested in an overview of representations of the Devil from antiquity until today, I suggest Jeffrey Burton Russell's four volume work *The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity*; *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition*; *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages*; and *Mephistopheles: The Devil in the Modern World*. Russell has also published a more popular discussion of the four volumes' main thesis in *The Prince of Darkness: Radical Evil and Power of Good in History*. However, Russell's study is strongly influenced by the fact that he himself seems to believe in the Devil (see especially *Mephistopheles*, p. 251, 296–301). Still, the study mainly restricts itself to a reiteration of the historical changes that have taken place in the representation

of the Devil over time. For an excellent discussion of the history of the Antichrist, see McGinn: *Antichrist.*

10 Cf. Kittsteiner: "Die Abschaffung des Teufels im 18. Jahrhundert."

11 Ricoeur: *Fallible Man*, p. xlvi.

12 For an overview of how evil is understood in different cultures, see Parkin (ed.): *The Anthropology of Evil.* For a discussion of the way evil appears in different world religions, see Cenkner (ed.): *Evil and the Response of World Religion.*

13 Blake: "A Divine Image," in *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake*, p. 32.

14 Mann: "The Problem of Freedom."

15 Cioran: *Drawn and Quartered*, p. 110.

16 Delbanco: *The Death of Satan*, p. 3.

17 Baudrillard: *The Transparency of Evil*, p. 81.

18 Andersen: "The Snow Queen," pp. 175–206. The similarity between Baudrillard's world-view and Andersen's "The Snow Queen" is only a partial one. In the fairy tale, those who get a splinter of the devil's mirror in their eye only *perceive* everything that is good and beautiful as evil and corrupt. According to Andersen, that is, it is only *as if* evil and corruption were found everywhere. On the other hand, Baudrillard believes that evil really *is* found everywhere.

19 Baudrillard: *The Transparency of Evil*, p. 81, 85.

20 Baudrillard: *Fatal Strategies*, p. 7.

21 Ibid., p. 77.

22 Delbanco: *The Death of Satan*, p. 9.

23 Ricoeur: *The Symbolism of Evil.*

24 Ibid., p. 350.

25 Rosenbaum: *Explaining Hitler*, p. xxi.

26 Ibid., p. 87.

27 Gauchet: *The Disenchantment of the World*, p. 168.

28 Wright: *The Moral Animal*, p. 368.

29 Watson: *Dark Nature*, p. 86.

30 Dostoevsky: "Environment," p. 136.

31 Harris: *The Silence of the Lambs*, p. 19.

32 Cf. Midgley: *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay*, p. 49.

33 Morris: "The Plot of Suffering: AIDS and Evil." Morris points to Levinas as an example of this idea, and some of Levinas's works do support this interpretation (cf. Levinas: "Useless Suffering"), but Levinas also describes evil as a responsibility persisting despite its refusal of responsibility to the Other (Levinas: *Humanism of the Other*, p. 56). In general, Morris's observation is true, but it's not necessarily correct to use Levinas as a typical representative of this conception of evil, since Levinas also upholds the dimension of personal responsibility.

34 For an example of this viewpoint, see Plack: *Die Gesellschaft und das Böse*.

35 Marquard: *Apologie des Zufälligens*, pp. 21ff.

36 See Rosenbaum: *Exploring Hitler* for a critical overview of the different explanations.

37 Shakespeare: *Hamlet*, II.ii.

38 The central reactions from intellectuals alive at the time (Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant etc.) to the earthquake in Lisbon are collected in Breidert (ed.): *Die Erschütterung der vollkommenen Welt*.

39 Novalis: *Pollen*, in *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, p. 9.

40 Gaita: *A Common Humanity*, p. 39.

41 Ricoeur: *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 303.

42 Levinas: *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, p. 128.

43 Cf. Ricoeur: *Fallible Man*, p. 4.

44 Heidegger's remarks on evil are nowhere assembled in his works into a systematic presentation, but he repeatedly returns to a statement of the problem. As far as I know, the one comprehensive account of Heidegger's reflections on evil is Irlenborn: *Der Ingrimm des Aufruhrs: Heidegger und das Problem des Bösen.* This study is marked by the same incomprehensibility that characterizes so much of the commentary on Heidegger, and so is not recommended for readers who do not have a comparatively solid knowledge of both Heidegger's earlier and later philosophy.

45 Cf. Heidegger: *Being and Time*, p. 331f; *Hölderlins Hymne, "Andenken,"* p. 102; *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* pp. 78f.

46 Cf. Heidegger: *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)*, pp. 81f.

47 See especially Heidegger's reflections on evil in Heidegger: *Feldweg-Gespräche.*

48 My discussion of Heidegger in *The Philosophy of Boredom*, pp. 131f., should provide a glimpse of the direction such a critique would take, namely criticizing Heidegger for a false ontologicalization of evil that causes him to overlook all concrete evils in favor of an essential force, Being, which he is not able to convincingly legitimate.

49 A representative selection of articles from this tradition can be found in Adams and Adams (eds.): *The Problem of Evil.*

50 Cf. Robertson: *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 454.

51 Cf. Glover: *Humanity*, p. 47.

52 Leyhausen: *Krieg oder Frieden*, p. 61.

53 Watson: *Dark Nature*, p. 160.

54 Hobbes: *De Cive*, pp. 58f.

55 Augustine: *City of God*, book XIX. 4.

56 Trevor-Roper: *The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, pp. 38f.

57 For an excellent discussion of the arguments for and against the thesis of uniqueness, see Brecher: "Understanding the Holocaust: The Uniqueness Debate."

58 Adorno: *Negative Dialectics*, p. 365.

59 Adorno: *Minima Moralia*, p. 65.

60 Cf. Naimark: *Fires of Hatred*, pp. 40f, 57f.

61 Cf. Hochschild: *King Leopold's Ghost*, p. 233.

62 Ibid., p. 224.

63 Sixty years before it assumed a central place in the Nürnberg Process, this expression was used by the historian George Washington Williams to describe the situation in the Congo.

64 Seen in this way, Belgium's actions in the Congo are more reminiscent of the German slaughter of the African Hereros: When the Hereros revolted against Germany in 1904, Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha gave the order that *every* Herero found on German territory should be shot. Over a couple of years, seventy-five percent of the Hereros—that is, about 60,000 people—on Germany territory had been exterminated (cf. Pakenham: *The Scramble for Africa*, p. 611). In both of these cases, evil can primarily be considered to be *instrumental.*

65 Cf. Gourevitch: *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*, p. 3. Gourevitch's book is exceptionally well written, but also rather journalistic. A more solid and well-documented work on the genocide in Rwanda is des Forges: *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

66 Tzvetan Todorov: *Facing the Extreme*, p. 134.

67 Courtois et. al.: *The Black Book of Communism*.

68 Cf. Glover: *Humanity*, p. 297.

69 Cited in Anissimov: *Primo Levi*, p. 1, 181.

70 For an overview of different variations on the evidential argument, see Howard-Snyder (ed.): *The Evidential Argument from Evil.*

71 In my opinion, the most convincing statement of the logical argument is put forth by John Mackie in the article "Evil and Omnipotence" (Mackie's article appears in a number of anthologies, among others in Adams and Adams (eds.): *The Problem of Evil*). For a more comprehensive thematisation, see also Mackie: *The Miracle of Theism.*

72 A letter to Nikojaj Aleksejevitsj Ljubimov May 10, 1879, in Dostoevsky: *Selected Letters*, p. 465.

73 Dostoevsky: *The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 315f.

74 Ibid., p. 317.

75 Ibid., p. 323.

76 Ibid p. 326. Dostoevsky also uses this example in "Pushkin (a Sketch)," p. 1287.

77 Heraclitus: *Fragments*, p. 39.

78 Plato: *The Republic*, 617e.

79 Plato: *Timaeus*, 29–30.

80 Lactantius: *The Wrath of God.*

81 Cf. Blumenthal: "Theodicy: Dissonance in Theory and Practice."

82 I do not discuss the so-called aesthetic argument here, because it's hardly convincing. The argument claims that good becomes more valuable when contrasted with evil. For example, Augustine (*City of God*, book XI.18) writes that the world's splendor would be diminished if good were not contrasted with evil. This thought is later found in Descartes (*Meditations*, fourth meditation) and Leibniz (*Theodicy*, § 214), but does not play a central role in either of them. The aesthetic argument fails because an *aesthetic* effect is not a good *moral* reason to allow suffering. This

claim is a categorical fallacy. The aesthetic argument is also untenable if we judge God as an individual. If God can inflict suffering on humanity for the sake of beautifying the world, we should be able do the same. In contrast, if it's not permissible for an individual to use aesthetics to justify inflicting suffering on another, it certainly should not be permissible for God.

83 Augustine: *Confessions*, VII.12–16.

84 Descartes: *Meditations on First Philosophy*, fourth meditation, pp. 45f.

85 Plotinus: *The Enneads*, p. 76.

86 See Augustine: *The Nature of the Good*, chap. 17 in *The Essential Augustine*, p. 49.

87 Augustine: *City of God*, book XI. 22.

88 Augustine: *The Nature of the Good*, chap. 4.

89 Pseudo-Dionysius has perhaps given the theory its most radical formulation in *On the Divine Names*. He writes that evil is neither being, nor *of* being, nor *in* being. In other words, evil has no existence whatsoever. For Pseudo-Dionysius, evil can only be described negatively, as non-being, non-beautiful, non-living, non-reasoning, etc. The privation theory can hardly find a more extreme representation that it does in Pseudo-Dionysius.

90 For example, Ralph Waldo Emerson was still insisting on the privation theory in an address from 1838 ("An Address," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 65), though in Emerson's time its role was already diminishing. Emerson argues in a classical way that evil reduces itself, and this is the punishment for evil. (This justification is further developed by Emerson in "Compensation," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, pp. 154ff.) There are also a few later privation theorists. For example, in *Wickedness*, Mary Midgley explicitly locates her discussion of

evil in a privation theoretical framework, describing evil as purely negative, stripped of its own positivity.

91 Plato, *The Republic*, 397c.

92 Ibid., 617e.

93 Ibid., 391e, 619c.

94 Augustine: *City of God*, book XII. 6.

95 Augustine bases his doctrine of original sin on *Romans* 5:12, but today there is widespread agreement that the doctrine hinges on a mistake in translation that is not found in the original Greek text.

96 Genesis, 3:22.

97 Romans, 5:18.

98 Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, I, 48, 2, 3.

99 Swinburne: *The Existence of God*, p. 200.

100 Mark 10:27, Luke 1:37, Genesis 18:14, Jeremiah 32:17, 27, Job 42:2.

101 Cf. Mackie: "Evil and Omnipotence."

102 There are other suggested solutions to the problem of natural evil. According to Swinburne, the free-will argument not only functions as a justification for the existence of moral evil, but also for natural (Swinburne: "Natural Evil"). The reason he gives is that natural evil must exist to give human beings the knowledge necessary to bring about moral evil. Here we could object that, in the first place, an almighty God could simply have given man the necessary knowledge without forcing him to take lessons from natural evil, and, in the second place, that man can learn more than enough from the moral evil he himself causes (cf. Stump: "Knowledge, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil"). Swinburne's argument further postulates that the free-will argument is a valid explanation of moral evil, but this is, as I've said, doubtful. On the other

hand, Alvin Plantinga argues that fallen angels rather than God are responsible for natural evil (Plantinga: *The Nature of Necessity*, p. 192). This is an argument that could well have been relevant in a historical epoch other than our own. However, as John Mackie makes clear, this idea is an arbitrary *ad hoc* solution, since we have no knowledge of such beings. In the best case, fallen angels form part of the religious hypothesis under discussion, and there's no independent reason to allude to them (Mackie: *The Miracle of Theism*, pp. 126f.).

103 John Keats: "To George and Georgina Keats, February 14 to May 8, 1819," p. 249.

104 Keat's phrase has become the slogan for the modern version of Irenaean theology, represented among others by John Hick. See especially Hick: *Evil and the God of Love.*

105 Weil: *Gravity and Grace*, p. 27.

106 Ibid., p. 81.

107 Ibid., p. 145.

108 Ibid., pp. 75f.

109 Marilyn McCord Adams later developed a concept of suffering very similar to that of Weil's, where suffering enables a mystical unity with God, whether or not the sufferer acknowledges it (Adams: *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God*, see especially chap. 8.)

110 Cioran: *On the Heights of Despair*, p. 109.

111 Amis: *London Fields*, p. 348.

112 Cf. Scarry: *The Body in Pain.*

113 Ibid., p. 34.

114 Camus: *The Plague*, p. 214.

115 Ibid., pp. 223ff.

116 Ibid., p. 226.

117 For a convincing formulation of this argument, see Rowe: "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism."

118 Hick: *Evil and the God of Love*, p. 330.

119 Plato: *Timaeus*, 29–30.

120 Augustine: *Confessions*, book 5.8.

121 Ibid., book 7.12–13. See Augustine: *Enchiridion*, chap. 10, in *The Essential Augustine*, p. 65.

122 Augustine: *City of God*, book XII.8.

123 Ibid., book I.29. There is no limit to the extremes Augustine will go in order to explain that absolutely everything must ultimately be regarded as good. One of his examples is: If a virgin is raped, it helps to destroy her actual or possible pride or arrogance, and therefore the act has an element of good in it (ibid., book 1. 28). And if a christened baby, the most innocent thing in the whole Augustinian universe, suffers greatly, it helps to teach us something about earthly life and makes us to long for God in His Heavenly kingdom (ibid., book XXII.22).

124 Boethius: *Consolation of Philosophy*, book IV.6.

125 Pope: *An Essay on Man*, book I, line 291f.

126 Rousseau: "Letter from J.-J. Rousseau to Mr. de Voltaire, August 18, 1756," p. 213.

127 Milton: *Paradise Lost*, book I, line 26, p. 3.

128 Ibid., book XII, line 469–73, p. 283.

129 Spinoza: *The Ethics*, 4P64.

130 Spinoza: *Letter to William Blyenbergh*, January 1665, pp. 238f.

131 Cf. Russell: *Mephistopheles*, pp. 37ff.

132 Goethe: *Faust*, p. 159, verse 1336f.

133 Correspondingly, Novalis sees suffering and sickness as means toward "a higher synthesis" (Novalis: *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia*).

134 Leibniz: *Theodicy*, § 21.

135 Ibid., § 20, 153.

136 Ibid., § 8, 9.

137 Ibid., § 9, 23, 24.

138 Ibid., § 121.

139 Ibid., § 130.

140 Leibniz also has other arguments. Among these is the assertion that there is not as much evil in the world as people suppose (ibid., § 220), and that God couldn't have shaped human beings as creatures of reason without allowing physical and moral evil (ibid., § 52, 119). The ultimate source of all evil is metaphysical evil, but man's free will is the direct cause of moral evil and therefore man is to blame for all of it (ibid., § 273, 288, 319). At the same time, the world is completely justified; therefore, we can trust that every unjust evil inflicted upon us by other people will be followed by at least the same amount of good (ibid., § 241).

141 Mackie: "Evil and Omnipotence."

142 See Marilyn McCord Adams's discussion of "horrendous evils" that inflict such suffering they transform a whole human life into something that's not worth living (Adams: *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God*, p. 26).

143 Cited in Rapp: *Fortschritt*, p. 159.

144 Hegel: *The Philosophy of History*, p. 15, 25.

145 Cf. Pauen: *Pessimismus*, p. 11.

146 Cf. Rapp: *Fortschritt*, p. 144.

147 Voltaire: *Candide*, p. 12.

148 Ibid., p. 52.

149 It may seen strange that I cite Kant in a discussion concerning theodicy, especially because he claims in a famous article that all philosophical theodicies must necessarily fail (Kant: "On

the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy"), but this is only true, he implies, of theodicies that are strictly theoretical. In fact, Kant develops a form of theodicy in both his moral philosophy—for example in the postulates on practical reason (Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason*) and in his philosophy of history. I limit my discussion here to the philosophy of history, but it should be noted that the subject is closely tied to Kant's moral philosophy, since theodicy in Kant changes from "natural theology" to "ethical theology" (cf. Kant: *Critique of Judgment* pp. 219–227).

150 Kant: "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, p. 36.

151 Kant: "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Praxis,'" in *Political Writings*, p. 90.

152 Kant: "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 6f.

153 Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, p. 211.

154 Kant: "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 7f.

155 Kant: *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* in *Anthropology, History and Education*, p. 338.

156 Kant: "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 29f.

157 Kant: *Toward Perpetual Peace*, in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 102f.

158 A problem with the whole *tendency* in Kant's thought comes from his idea that it is through humanity's enlightenment and autonomy that the good will be realized, while, at the same time, Kant denies that man's intentions will play any substantial role in the realization of this goal on a global scale, and instead leaves this

task to nature's design. We can imagine three possibilities with regard to the relationship between man's intentional actions and history's progress: (1) the two function completely independent of the other, (2) history is driven by its own engine and human enlightenment is a product of history, or (3) human enlightenment propels history toward a realization of the ideal life. The whole tendency in Kant's thinking speaks for (3), but it's nonetheless (2) that Kant embraces. Humanity is placed in a situation whose outcome was established beforehand, independent of what you and I might choose to do. In *Critique of Judgment* (§83), however, we find a slightly different viewpoint. Instead of regarding the progress of history as something originating in a more or less mechanically functioning natural law, the perspective changes. Progress is now understood as a byproduct of humanity. Of course, nature still plays an essential role, but the understanding of nature has evolved away from what we might call natural history, resituating it as an element somewhere between the natural world and freedom. Nature "acts" to stimulate progress toward an ever more cultivated and civilized (though not necessarily moral) world order. However, in being thus stimulated, man is perfected along the way; he becomes capable, to a larger and larger degree, of taking destiny into his own hands. We can perhaps sum up this idea in the following way: Nature drives humanity toward enlightenment, and after that we're in a position to take control. Nature has a plan for humanity, but the enlightened individual understands this plan and aids in its realization.

159 Kant: "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," in *Political Writings*, p. 220; cf. Kant: "Conjectural Beginnings of Human History," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, p. 36; Kant: *Toward Perpetual Peace* p. 92.

160 Cf. Kant: "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 122f.

161 Hegel: *The Philosophy of History*, p. 33.

162 Ibid., p. 15. Hegel concludes the essay on the philosophy of history by repeating the idea that the recognition of world history as the spirit's actualization is the only true theodicy (ibid., p. 457).

163 Ibid., p. 33.

164 Herder: *Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind*, p. 88.

165 Hegel: *The Philosophy of History*, p. 21.

166 Ibid., p. 37.

167 Ibid., pp. 66f.

168 Cf. Hollander: "Revisiting the Banality of Evil: Political Violence in Communist Systems," p. 56.

169 Cf. Getty and Naumov: *The Road to Terror*.

170 Cf. Pauen: *Pessimismus*, p. 31.

171 Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Representation*, p. 325; *Parerga and Paralipomena II*, p. 368.

172 Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Representation*, p. 326.

173 Ibid., *The World as Will and Representation: Volume 2*, p. 643.

174 Ibid., p. 583.

175 Cf. Lacroix: *Das Böse*, p. 77.

176 This inverted theodicy receives a clear expression in Giacomo Leopardi, who claims that all happiness is either deceitful or illusionary (Leopardi: *The Canti*, p. 65). In reality, everything is rooted in evil, even though at times it can seem otherwise. Existence itself is evil, and true happiness can only be found in nonexistence.

177 Nietzsche: *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 19.

178 Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente* 1884–1885, pp. 625f.

179 Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 49.

180 Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, p. 180.

181 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 225.

182 Nietzsche: *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 270.

183 Airaksinen: *The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade*, p. 5.

184 Sade: *Justine*, p. 458.

185 Ibid., p. 481.

186 Ibid., pp. 481f, cf. pp. 128ff. This espousal of an evil providence is purely rhetorical, for there is no place for a metaphysical concept such as providence in Sade's worldview. His universe is a cold machine where all bodies are mechanical, in keeping with La Mettrie's *Man a Machine*—a Cartesian concept without any *res cogitans*. Everything can be quantified. Because every qualitative difference disappears, all moral difference disappears as well. The fact that a human being has qualities that an insect lacks is irrelevant: mass is mass. The essential quality of action is the size of the organs, the number of sexual acts, partners, and orifices, the amount of sperm and blood and the number of victims. Quantity is the same as intensity and therefore also as quality. For Sade, quantity is the only quality. The human body, both your own and that of another, is raw material that should be used, and its pleasure is directly proportional to its consumption.

187 Kant: *Metaphysics of Morals* in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 473.

188 Job 40:8f.

189 Of course, Hobbes agrees with God and says that God is just precisely *because* he's so powerful. (Hobbes: *Leviathan*, chap. 31, p. 246.)

190 Ecclesiastes 9:16.

191 Job 28:12.

192 Job 28:28.

193 Job 42:7.

194 Cf. Acts 10:34, Romans 2:11; Galatians 2:6.

195 Ecclesiastes 7:15.

196 Mark 10:18, Matthew 19:17, Luke 18:19.

197 Calvin: *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, p. 141.

198 Mill: *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, pp. 273f.

199 Jaspers: *Von der Wahrheit*, p. 533.

200 Plato, *The Republic*, 392b.

201 Cf. Lerner: *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion*.

202 Cf. Ferry: *Man made God*.

203 Cf. Gauchet: *The Disenchantment of the World*, p. 199.

204 Lyotard: *The Postmodern Condition*.

205 Delbanco: *The Death of Satan*, p. 143.

206 Ricoeur: *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 301.

207 Genesis 6:5; cf. Ecclesiastes 9:3.

208 Genesis 8:21.

209 Machiavelli: *Discourses*, book 1, chap. 3.

210 Hobbes: *Leviathan*, chap. 13.

211 Machiavelli wants to cancel out evil with evil. Instead of being a victim of evil, he decides to actually do evil. According to Machiavelli, the weakest position is somewhere between good and evil, and a person should choose to be wholly good or wholly evil (*Discourses*, book I, chap. 26). However, because people are essentially evil, goodness will ultimately result in self-annihilation. The only true alternative is to opt for the greatest evil possible, because paradoxically this choice will limit evil. This idea is not relevant to all spheres of life, of course, but a prince must be ready to exercise maximum brutality when the situation requires it. Machiavelli's whole political philosophy can be summed up in the cliché

that violence is always the best answer. It's also worth noting that Machiavelli's whole political philosophy is structured around his anthropology.

212 Montaigne: "On Cruelty," p. 182.

213 Lautréamont: *Maldoror*, p. 31.

214 Melville: *Billy Budd*, p. 326. See also the following description of Claggart: "With no power to annul the elemental evil in him, tho' readily enough he could hide it; a nature like Claggart's surcharged with energy as such natures almost invariably are, what recourse is left to it but to recoil upon itself and [. . .] act out to the end the part allotted it." Ibid., p. 328.

215 Rousseau: *Emile*, pp. 39f.

216 Rousseau: *On the Origin of Inequality*, p. 115.

217 Ibid., p. 109.

218 Rousseau: *Emile*, p. 67.

219 Ibid., p. 282.

220 Ibid., p. 67.

221 Ibid., pp. 104f.

222 Cf. Grant: *Hypocrisy and Integrity* and Bloom: "Introduction," pp. 12f.

223 The following story about the wild boy of Aveyron is taken from Masters: *The Evil That Men Do*, pp. 4ff., 31f., 67, 203.

224 Rousseau, for that matter, knew about several cases of children who grew up without human contact, who were fostered by wolves or the like, but he didn't explicitly use these examples in his discussion of the natural man. (Cf. Rousseau: *A Discourse on Inequality*, p. 140n.)

225 Cf. Gelven: *The Risk of Being*, pp. 162f.

226 No one only does good or only does evil. Dennis Nilsen, one of Great Britain's worst serial killers, helped some of the young men he lured to his home, who were often destitute—feeding

them and sending them on their way. Others, however, he murdered. In 1970, Ted Bundy saved a three year-old from drowning (cf. Masters: *The Evil That Men Do*, pp. 10f.) In this context, we can also mention Quisling, who helped to save thousands of Ukranian Jews from starvation in the 1920s. Nonetheless, he was responsible for the deportation of a third of the Norwegian Jews in 1942 and 1943.

227 Schelling: *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, p. 23.

228 Cf. Nancy: *The Experience of Freedom*, p. 135.

229 Alford: *What Evil Means to Us*, p. 32.

230 Ibid., p. 142.

231 Leibniz: *Theodicy*, § 21.

232 Hick: *Evil and the God of Love*, p. 21.

233 Griffin: *God, Power and Evil*, pp. 27f.

234 Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, I–II, 92.

235 See the documents collected in Getty and Naumov: *The Road to Terror.*

236 In my opinion, Hitler represented an extreme form of this type of evil, because he was convinced that his ideology, and the actions legitimated by his ideology, was entirely just. In Hitler's eyes, the National Socialist movement represented the good.

237 Cf. Baumeister: *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*, chap. 6.

238 Kant: *Reflexion* 6900.

239 Cf. Baumeister: *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*, chaps. 1 and 2.

240 For more on this gap, see ibid., pp. 18f.

241 Conroy: *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People*, p. 88.

242 Cf. Katz: *Seductions of Crime*, pp. 5ff. Also see Sofsky: *Traktat über die Gewalt*, chaps. 5 and 10.

243 Though it should be noted here that most soldiers do *not* shoot at the enemy. Only as high as between fifteen and twenty-five percent of American troops shot at enemy positions or personnel during the Second World War, even though around eighty percent of them had the opportunity to do so (Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, p. 75). There's reason to believe that the corresponding figures for soldiers during the First World War are even lower. Such ineffectiveness was considered unacceptable, so the United States revised its military training methods in an effort to create more efficient killing machines. The marines especially upped the brutality of their training process—employing, among other things, depersonalization, destruction of all privacy, unilateral induction into a group mentality at the cost of individuality, extreme physical stress, harsh punishments, forced lack of sleep, strict emphasis on the absolute necessity of following orders no matter how absurd they might seem, etc. That the same men who went on to receive this kind of "education" turned around and carried out the massacre in My Lai shouldn't have come as a surprise to anyone. We should mention too that bayonet training is still included in such training, not because bayonets are an especially common weapon—they made up only one percent of all the weapons used in both world wars, and today only form about a thousandth of a percentile—but because they desensitize soldiers (ibid., pp. 89–93, 153). People capable of killing other people with a bayonet will presumably have fewer qualms about killing a person from a greater distance.

244 Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, chap. 1.

245 Cited in ibid., p. 31.

246 Cited in Glover: *Humanity*, pp. 54f.

247 Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, pp. 356f.

248 Cf. Norris: *Serial Killers*, p. 32.

249 Jack Katz lists a number of such cases in *Seductions of Crime*, chap. 8.

250 Montaigne: "On Cruelty," p. 181.

251 Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Representation I*, p. 363.

252 Lang: *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, p. 29, 56.

253 Alford: *What Evil Means to Us*, p. 21.

254 Bataille: *Literature and Evil*, pp. 17f.

255 Kekes: *Facing Evil*, p. 126, 131.

256 McGinn: *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, pp. 62ff., 82.

257 Ibid., pp. 65ff.

258 Rawls: *A Theory of Justice*, p. 439.

259 Augustine: *Confessions*, book 2.4 and 2.6.

260 Ibid., book 2.4.

261 Cf. Airaksinen: *The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade*, p. 103.

262 Cited in ibid., p. 150.

263 Milton: *Paradise Lost*, book 4, line 111.

264 This idea is also found in Isaiah 14:12ff.

265 Milton: *Paradise Lost*, book 1, lines 159–162.

266 Ibid., book 4, line 957.

267 Poe: "The Black Cat," in *The Complete Illustrated Stories and Poems*, p. 237.

268 Poe: "The Imp of the Perverse," in *The Complete Illustrated Stories and Poems*, p. 441.

269 Ibid., p. 440.

270 Cf. Davidson: "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?," p. 42.

271 McGinn: *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, p. 101.

272 In contrast to his mentor Hegel (cf. Hegel: *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume I*, pp. 221ff.). Karl Rosenkranz pointed out that the most evil can do is evoke aesthetic interest

(Rosenkranz: *Ästhetik des Häßlichen*, pp. 260–309) and this idea strongly influenced modernism.

273 Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 23, p. 62.

274 Ibid § 28, p. 76.

275 Cited in Oppenheimer: *Evil and the Demonic*, p. 79.

276 Soldiers' perception of the wars they take part in are shaped by the movies they've seen. Many express disappointment that war doesn't live up to the expectations created by the movies, while others claim they experienced the whole war as if it were a film. (Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, pp. 26ff.)

277 Bjørnvig: *Den æstetiske idiosynkrasi*, p. 41. Translated by Kerri A. Pierce.

278 Poe: "The Tell-Tale Heart" in *The Complete Illustrated Stories and Poems*, p. 244.

279 Hamsun: "Fra det ubevidste Sjæleliv."

280 Melville: *Billy Budd*, see especially p. 327.

281 Lang: *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, p. 29, 56.

282 Cf. Walter Benjamin's remark that fascists aestheticize politics, while communists politicize art ("The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," p. 242).

283 Nietzsche: *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, p. 180.

284 Genet: *The Thief's Journal*, p. 5.

285 Ibid., p. 162.

286 Ibid., p. 154.

287 Ibid., pp. 64, 174ff.

288 Ibid., pp. 14f.

289 Baudelaire: "Hymn to Beauty," in *Baudelaire*, p. 42.

290 Baudelaire: "To the Reader," in ibid., p. 13.

291 Cf. Alford: *What Evil Means to Us*, p. 32, 126.

292 I have analyzed *American Psycho* comparatively exhaustively in another context and shall not repeat my findings here. Instead,

I'll content myself with saying that we find the acknowledgment motivation well represented there. (Svendsen: *Philosophy of Boredom*, pp. 69–80.)

293 Morgenthau: "Love and Power."

294 McGinn: *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, p. 80.

295 For a discussion of symbolic representations of evil, see Alford: *What Evil Means to Us*, pp. 12f., 44f., 113ff., 146f.

296 Plato: *Philebus*, 48b7.

297 McGinn: *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, p. 66.

298 Arthur Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Representation II*, p. 693; *Parerga and Paralipomena II*, p. 215; *On the Basis of Morality*, p. 156, 158.

299 Kant: *Metaphysics of Morals* in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 577.

300 Kant: *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 197f., 420f.

301 For a broad philosophical thematisation of schadenfreude and its history, see Portmann: *When Bad Things Happen to Other People*.

302 Cf. Sofsky: *Traktat über die Gewalt*, pp. 119f.

303 Plato: *Protagoras*, 352a; cf. Plato: *Meno*, 88d, *Gorgias* 460b., 509e, Xenophon: *The Memorabilia*, book 3.9.

304 Plato *Protagoras* 352a–358d.

305 Plato: *The Republic* 439a–441c.

306 Aristotle: *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1110b17.

307 Ibid., 1152a.

308 Ibid., book 7.8.

309 Ibid., 1079b.

310 Romans 7:19.

311 Sartre: *Baudelaire*, p. 71.

312 Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, I, II, 27, 1.

313 Leibniz: *Theodicy*, § 45, 154.

314 Hume: *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, p. 277.

315 Rousseau: *Emile*, p. 243.

316 Ibid., p. 105.

317 Kant: *Lectures on Ethics*, p. 198.

318 Kant: *Vorarbeiten zur Religion innherhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, p. 101.

319 Cf. Kant: *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* in *Basic Writings of Kant*, pp. 181f.

320 Cf. Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason* in *Practical Philosophy*, pp. 195ff.

321 Cf. Kant: "Reflexionen zur Anthropologie," *Reflexion* 1226.

322 Kant: *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 32. Hereafter, this title will be shortened to *Religion*.

323 Cf. Anderson-Gold: "Kant's Rejection of Devilishness: The Limits of Human Volition."

324 Kant: *Religion*, pp. 24f.

325 Allison: *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, p. 40.

326 Kant: *Religion*, p. 19.

327 Kant: *Metaphysics of Morals* in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 536.

328 Cf. Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason* in *Practical Philosophy* pp. 187ff.

329 Kant: *Metaphysics of Morals* in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 380.

330 Kant: "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," p. 227.

331 Kant: *Religion*, p. 40; cf. Kant: *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 420, Kant: *Lectures on Pedagogy* in *Anthropology, History and Education*, p. 478.

332 Kant: *Religion*, p. 31.

333 Ibid., p. 26.

334 Kant: *Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, p. 102

335 Kant: *Religion*, p. 25, 30.

336 Ibid., p. 27.

337 Ibid., pp. 16f.

338 Ibid., p. 66.

339 Ibid., p. 28.

340 Ibid., pp. 56f.

341 Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. B274, A551n./B579n.; Kant: *Reflections on Metaphysics, Reflection* 5612 and 5616.

342 Kant: *Religion*, p. 16.

343 Kant: *Religion*, pp. 34f.

344 Ibid., p. 27.

345 Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason* in *Practical Philosophy*, pp. 219f. Cf. *Religion*, p. 33.

346 *Romans*, 4:15, 5:13.

347 Kant: *Religion*, pp. 18ff.

348 Ibid., p. 38.

349 Ibid., p. 20.

350 Ibid., p. 18–19n.

351 Ibid., p. 25, 32.

352 Ibid., p. 43.

353 Ibid., p. 62.

354 Ibid., p. 3.

355 Ibid., pp. 17ff.

356 Becker: *Escape from Evil*, p. xvii.

357 Ibid., p. 148.

358 Novalis: *Teplitzer Fragments* in *Schriften*, p. 398.

359 Cohn: *Europe's Inner Demons*.

360 Nietzsche: *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 153.

361 For a historic thematisation of such idea pairs, see Koselleck: "Zur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriffe."

362 Schmitt: *The Concept of the Political*, p. 37.

363 Novalis: *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia*, p. 121.

364 Cf. Matthew 25:31–46.

365 Gourevitch: *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*, p. 95.

366 Cf. Naimark: *Fires of Hatred*, pp. 14f. and chap. 5.

367 Whether you consider the war to have been a war between two countries or an internal conflict, these deportations were a war crime. Forced deportation in war is prohibited by Article 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, a prohibition that was expanded in Protocol II from 1977 to include internal conflicts.

368 In part, Göring's defense strategy in the Nuremberg Trials was to proclaim that the war's victors, who were now putting him on trial, were guilty of similar crimes, both in the war against Germany and in earlier periods of nation building. And Göring was largely right: the United State's very existence is based upon the extermination of a whole people; England's riches were the result of an inhuman colonialism; the Soviet Union was at least as totalitarian as the Germans; the bombing of German civilians during World War II reached the proportions of an extreme war crime; and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japanese civilians should similarly be regarded as criminal. In Casablanca in January 1943, Great Britain and the United States drew up a plan for a massive bombing campaign of German civilians meant to "destroy morale"—which was then carried out. If we put any stock in the concept of human rights, which holds that civilians should be protected as much as possible in war, than this—as much as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—should be regarded as a serious breach. And what about the Allied blockade of Germany

after World War I, *after* the war had already been decided, which led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people? Göring was partially right in his assertions. His mistake was that be persisted in believing that these facts lessened his own guilt. Göring's guilt was just as great, but a number of the war's "victors" should also have been put on trial.

369 Alouni: "Transcript."

370 Numbers 31:1–19.

371 1 Samuel 15:3.

372 See for example Joshua 8:22ff., 10:28–40, 11:10–14.

373 Vetlesen: "Ondskap Bosnia," p. 96.

374 For a well-informed discussion of the social psychology of prejudice, see Duckitt: *The Social Psychology of Prejudice.*

375 Cf. Hochschild: *King Leopold's Ghost*, p. 16.

376 Anderson: *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.

377 Cf. Naimark: *Fires of Hatred*, chap. 5.

378 Kapuściński: *Soccer War*, pp. 157–85.

379 Cf. Gibbon: *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume V*, pp. 66–72.

380 Freud: *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 72.

381 Ignatieff: *The Warrior's Honor*, p. 50.

382 Erwin Staub (*The Roots of Evil*, p. 58) tells the story of an English experiment where thirty-two young boys from Bristol were shown a number of dots on a screen, and afterwards asked to guess how many dots they'd seen. Half the boys were told that they belonged to the group that had overestimated the number, and the other half were told they belonged to the opposite group. After that, every boy was asked to divide up a sum of money between two other boys, and the only information they were given about these boys were that one belonged to the first group and one

belonged to the second. On this basis alone, the boys systematically discriminated between the recipients, and gave more money to those in the same category as themselves. Group solidarity provided no rational basis for handling the money, but it was nonetheless sufficient to lead to discriminatory behavior.

383 Aristotle: *Politics*, 1253a7ff.

384 Cf. Sofsky: *Traktat über die Gewalt*, p. 162.

385 Emerson: "Compensation," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 167.

386 Blake: "Annotations in Lavater's *Aphorisms on Man*," in *The Complete Poetry of William Blake*, p. 589.

387 Todorov: *Facing the Extreme*, p. 200.

388 See for example May: *Power and Innocence.*

389 For a readable thematization of this problem, see Cruikshank: "Revolutions Within: Self-government and Self-esteem."

390 Cf. Berkowitz: *Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences, and Control*, pp. 143f. See also Baumeister: *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*, chap. 5.

391 Generally speaking, we can distinguish between three different definitions of violence: (1) broad, (2) narrow, and (3) legitimacy-based. (1): Broad definitions of violence encompass a multitude of different phenomena, for example social injustice. One of the most common broad definitions of violence is Johan Galtung's idea of "structural violence," which suggests that violence occurs when people are influenced to such an extent that they cannot realize their full somatic and mental potential (Galtung: "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," p. 168.). The problem with this definition is that it makes it difficult to imagine a sphere of human life *not* permeated by violence. The concept of violence, therefore, becomes watered down. (2): Narrow definitions of violence are more

in keeping with the general use of the word and refer to human actions that deliberately cause psychical, or even emotional, damage. Galtung's idea of "personal violence" belongs to this category. (3): The third type of violence, legitimacy-based violence, is principally a narrower version of (2), where the concept of violence is reserved for deliberate actions that cause harm such that these actions are not legitimated by a country's laws. In my opinion, this definition is counter-intuitive, and a given action—for example, a police beating of protesters—is not made less violent just because it might be validated by law. I believe (2) is the most reasonable definition, and if not otherwise indicated, I use the term "violence" in the narrower sense.

392 Honderich: *Violence for Equality*, p. 153.

393 Cf. Baumeister: *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*, pp. 274f.

394 Athens: *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*, pp. 32–41.

395 Katz: *Seductions of Crime*, p. 19.

396 For an insightful discussion of this idea, see Emerson: "Experience," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 323.

397 Cf. Katz: *Seductions of Crime*, p. 12.

398 Athens: *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*, chap. 6 and 7.

399 See Katz: *Seductions of Crime*, chap. 3, about "the badass."

400 Arendt: *The Life of the Mind: Thinking*, p. 4

401 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 276.

402 Ibid., p. 252, 287, 288.

403 Arendt: *The Life of the Mind: Thinking*, pp. 3ff.

404 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 285, 288; Arendt: *The Life of the Mind: Thinking*, p. 3.

405 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 276.

406 La Rochefoucauld: *Maxims*, § 269 (p. 55) and § 387 (p. 79).

407 Pascal: *Pensées*, p. 179.

408 Baudelaire: "The Counterfeit Coin," in *Prose Poems*, p. 74.

409 Camus: *The Plague*, p. 131.

410 Leopardi: "Memorable Sayings of Filippo Ottonieri" in *Operette Morali*, p. 307, 309.

411 Bonhoeffer: *Letters and Papers from Prison*, pp. 8f.

412 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 287f.

413 Arendt: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 459.

414 Ibid., p. 458.

415 Ibid., pp. 447f.

416 Ibid., pp. 451f.

417 Ibid., pp. 453f.

418 Ibid., p. 459.

419 Ibid., p. ix, 459.

420 Ibid., pp. 432f.

421 For a discussion of the purges under Stalin, see Getty and Naumov: *The Road to Terror*. This work is mainly composed of recently released internal documents from the Central Committee under Stalin together with commentary.

422 Ibid., pp. 470–81, 518–21, 583.

423 Ibid., pp. xiii, 272ff., 578.

424 Arendt: *Crises of the Republic*, p. 108.

425 Arendt: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 460.

426 Ibid., p. 468.

427 Arendt: *Vita Activa*, chap. 5.; *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, pp. 456f.

428 A selection of interrogation records by the Israeli police are published in Lang and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*.

429 For a discussion of this aspect, see Rosenthal: *A Good Look at Evil*, pp. 163–80.

430 Furthermore, I essentially limit myself to the picture Arendt paints of Eichmann. As David Cesarani points out in his book *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a "Desk Murderer,"* Arendt was only present for an extremely limited time during the trial. Cesarani finds many faults with Arendt's view of Eichmann, and I find Cesarini to be the more reliable biographer. However, since this chapter is more devoted to Arendt's thought than to an accurate portrayal of Eichmann, I have generally adhered to Arendt's interpretation of him.

431 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 25f., 48f.

432 Ibid., p. 92.

433 Lang and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*, p. 80.

434 Ibid., 104.

435 Ibid., pp. 96, 111, 118, 131. 197f.

436 Ibid., p. 104.

437 Ibid., p. 173.

438 Ibid., p. 199.

439 Weber: "Politics as a Vocation" in *Max Weber's Complete Writings*, p. 173.

440 Lang and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*, p. 144f, cf. pp. 157f., 197f., 208, 271f. Considered in this way, Eichmann is also reminiscent of Max Weber's protestant capitalist, who puts work above personal pleasure, because work is the way to salvation. The Weber capitalist completely dedicates himself to doing the best job possible in a system whose rules he never pauses to reflect on. Instead, he merely accepts the rules as a given.

441 Weber: "Bureaucracy" in *From Max Weber*, p. 228.

442 Cf. Nagel: *Mortal Questions*, p. 77.

443 Lang and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*, p. 288.

444 Cf. Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 136.

445 Kant: *Metaphysics of Morals* in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 505; Kant: *Religion*, p. 90n.

446 Lang and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*, p. 40f.

447 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 247f.

448 Ibid., p. 109.

449 Land and Sibyll: *Eichmann Interrogated*, p. 289.

450 Ibid., p. 150, 157.

451 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 114.

452 Ibid., p. 287.

453 Cf. Luke 23:34; Acts 7:60.

454 Bauman: *Modernity and the Holocaust*.

455 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, pp. 48f., 53; Arendt: *The Life of the Mind: Thinking*, p. 4.

456 Arendt: *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p. 287.

457 Ibid., p. 252.

458 Höss: *Commandant of Auschwitz*, p. 131.

459 Ibid., p. 178.

460 Levi: "Introduction."

461 Höss: *Commandant of Auschwitz*, p. 67.

462 Ibid., p. 71f.

463 Ibid., p. 67.

464 Ibid., pp. 80ff.

465 Ibid., pp. 178f.

466 Ibid., p. 116.

467 For a good examination of this idea, see Todorov: *Facing the Extreme*.

468 Höss: *Commandant of Auschwitz*, p. 111.

469 Ibid., p. 54.

470 Ibid., p. 76.
471 Ibid., p. 184.
472 Ibid., pp. 152f.
473 Ibid., p. 144.
474 Sereny: *Into that Darkness*, p. 39, 364.
475 Ibid., p. 364.
476 Ibid., p. 157.
477 Ibid., p. 229.
478 Ibid., p. 100.
479 Ibid., p. 101, 232.
480 Ibid., p. 201.
481 Ibid., p. 203.
482 Ibid., p. 35, 55, 110, 113, 134, 164, 233.
483 Ibid., p. 29, 364f.
484 Ibid., p. 113.
485 Ibid., p. 164.
486 Ibid., p. 164.
487 Ibid., p. 164.
488 Ibid., pp. 232f.
489 Ofstad: *Vår forakt for svakhet.*
490 *Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944*, p. 396.
491 Sereny: *Into that Darkness*, p. 200. Seneca has already written about how evil tends to escalate, and that a person can develop his own blasé, routine form of evil (Seneca: "On Anger" in *Dialogues and Essays*, pp. 29f.). This habituation can happen terrifyingly fast. An SS doctor at Auschwitz, Johann Paul Kremer, who kept a diary during the time he was stationed at the camp, expressed his horror at what he saw there in the first two diary entries he wrote on arrival—after that, he never mentioned it again. (Cf. Katz: *Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil*, p. 50–60. See also Lifton: *The Nazi Doctors.*)

492 Hegel discusses habit as being a "second nature" (Hegel: *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 410). In my opinion, this idea captures something essential about habits. If we distinguish between *instincts* and *habits*, we can describe instincts as belonging to our first nature (those things we were born with) and habits as belonging to our second nature (those things we learn along the way, but that are so strongly internalized that they approach pure instinct in terms of immediacy and necessity). The difference between our first and second natures is that the first is inborn and the second can be changed.

493 Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf*, p. 402.

494 Ibid., p. 297.

495 We can draw a parallel here with communism, especially as it played out under Stalin. Although there was no clearly articulated Führer principle, the party principle was just as strong. An individual was expected to subjugate himself to the party without reservation and there was no place for individual reflection and conscience. (Cf. Getty and Naumov: *The Road to Terror*.)

496 Cf. Emerson: "Politics," in *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, p. 65.

497 Himmler's famous speech in Posen in 1943 shows that the Nazis considered the mass exterminations to be a dirty secret. The speech reveals a contrast between the emphasis placed on honor and duty on the one hand, and the necessity to remain silent for all time on the other. The necessity for secrecy—not simply with regard to the strategic considerations of a certain situation, but for *all time*—reveals an awareness that these actions were immoral. Kant formulates a public principle for evaluating an action's legitimacy: "All actions that affect the rights of other human beings, the maxims of which are incompatible with publicity, are unjust." (Kant: *Toward Perpetual Peace* in *Toward Perpetual Peace*

and Other Writings, p. 104.) Kant emphasizes that this idea applies both to the moral and the juridical evaluations of an action.

498 Lifton: *The Nazi Doctors*, p. 418–65.

499 For example, we can think of the engineers who constructed the Nazis' cremation ovens. In 1950, one of these engineers, Martin Klettner, was still trying now and then to get a patent for one of the ovens he'd helped develop in Auschwitz. (Cf. Pressac: *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers*, pp. 103, 105, 244.)

500 Cf. Glass: *Life Unworthy of Life*, pp. 88f.

501 For an excellent study of the doctors, see Lifton: *The Nazi Doctors*. The doctors in the concentration camps had taken the Hippocratic oath, but they committed actions that were diametrically opposed to that oath, seemingly without a single pang of conscience. They injected different organic material, including viruses and bacteria, into the prisoners, removed brain tissue and transplanted organs into living people without bothering to use anesthesia, stuck people in pressure chambers, in boiling and ice-cold water, etc. They were enacting an inverted Hippocratic oath. Of course, there were a few doctors who refused to take part, and none of these were punished in any way—they were simply given different jobs. However, the majority seemed to have very little objection to these experiments.

502 In Auschwitz, a large portion of the prisoners also had a number tattooed on their arm, and this number replaced their names, dehumanizing the prisoners even more. We can also remark in this context that these tattoos were yet another blow to orthodox Jews, because the Law of Moses forbids tattooing and the like (*Leviticus* 19:28, cf. *Deuteronomy* 14:1). However, I doubt that this was done intentionally, and I believe that the tattooing was mainly motivated by dehumanization and other "logistical" considerations.

503 Cited in Glass: *Life Unworthy of Life*, p. 27.

504 Lang: *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, p. 210.

505 Ibid., p. 29, 56.

506 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 493n43, 593n23.

507 Finkelstein and Birn: *A Nation on Trial.*

508 Cited in Bauman: *Modernity and the Holocaust*, p. 75.

509 Bauman: pp. 109f., 165ff.

510 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 194.

511 Ibid., p. 255.

512 Ibid., p. 580n108.

513 Ibid., p. 315.

514 Ibid., pp. 416, 479.

515 Glass: *Life Unworthy of Life.*

516 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, pp. 170f.

517 Johnson and Reuband: *What We Knew. Terror, Mass Murder and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany.*

518 Staub: *The Roots of Evil*, p. 38.

519 Aly: *Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State.*

520 Browning: *Ordinary Men*. Browning's study has been forcefully criticized by Goldhagen in *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, but in a new afterword to the 1998 edition of *Ordinary Men*, Browning gives a convincing response to this criticism. I am not a specialist in this area, but I find Browning's study more attractive than Goldhagen's, simply because Browning's assertions seem to be better supported than Goldhagen's. See also Bettina Birn's defense of Browning and critique of Goldhagen in Finkelstein and Birn: *A Nation on Trial.*

521 Browning: *Ordinary Men*, pp. 225f.

522 Ibid., p. 161.

523 Ibid., p. 57.

524 Ibid., pp. 61f.

525 Ibid., p. 74.

526 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 553n68.

527 Browning: *Ordinary Men*, p. 214.

528 An especially shocking example is a group from Berlin, exclusively on hand to support the troops, who should have had no part in the killings. They asked for permission to participate in the shooting of the Jews, and received consent. (Ibid., p. 112.)

529 Ibid., pp. 73, 150ff., 184.

530 Ibid., p. 48.

531 Ibid., pp. 85ff.

532 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 237.

533 Cited in Browning: *Ordinary Men*, p. 216.

534 Ibid., p. 72.

535 Ibid., p. 184.

536 During World War II, under thirty percent of the soldiers in the American Air Force expressed a hatred for the enemy, while between twenty-seven and thirty-eight percent of the soldiers in the infantry mentioned hatred as a motivation for killing. On the other hand, sixty percent cited loyalty to their comrades as the most important factor. In later wars, which take place at greater distances, this claim is more and more prevalent. (Cf. Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, pp. 157f.)

537 Cited in ibid., pp. 171f.

538 Cited in ibid., p. 191.

539 Ibid., p. 226.

540 The following remarks concerning the protests against the trial against Calley are taken from Bourke: *An Intimate History of Killing*, pp. 193f.

541 Ibid., pp. 195f.

542 This example is taken from Conroy: *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People*, pp. 138f.

543 See Katz: *Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil*, p. 84–90.

544 See Todorov: *Facing the Extreme*, p. 122.

545 A military tribunal in Tokyo (1946–48) uncovered examples of extreme cruelty in the treatment of prisoners of war, an investigation which, among other things, showed that twenty-seven percent of captured Allied soldiers died in Japanese custody, while corresponding tallies for soldiers in German and Italian custody were four percent. (Cf. Robertson: *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 223.)

546 Cf. Glover: *Humanity*, p. 294.

547 Milgram: *Obedience to Authority*.

548 Baron: *Human Aggression*, pp. 260ff.

549 Milgram: *Obedience to Authority*, p. 205.

550 Levi: *The Drowned and the Saved*, p. 56.

551 Arendt: *Life of the Mind: Thinking*, p. 78.

552 Ibid., p. 193.

553 Ibid., p. 13.

554 Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 40, pp. 102f.

555 Kant: "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, p. 17.

556 Adorno: "Education After Auschwitz" in *Can One Live After Auschwitz?*, p. 23.

557 Cf. Arendt: *Life of the Mind: Thinking*, p. 5, 191.

558 Euripedes: *Orestes and Other Plays*, p. 59, line 396.

559 Ted Bundy, who certainly wasn't much troubled by his conscience, criticized the concept of guilt, which he believed to be a social control mechanism and "*very* unhealthy" (Hare: *Without*

Conscience, p. 41). It's uncertain how many women Bundy murdered, but it was at least seventeen, probably many more, and it's indisputable that Bundy would have been a far less "unhealthy" element in society if he'd been capable of feeling guilt.

560 Gelven: *The Risk of Being*, p. 22–37.

561 Conrad: *Heart of Darkness*, p. 87.

562 Ibid., p. 111.

563 Solzhenitsyn: *The Gulag Archipelago*, pp. 615f.

564 Sæterbakken: *Det onde øye*, p. 20.

565 Ricoeur: *Fallible Man*, p. 133.

566 Ibid., p. 142.

567 Ibid., p. 144.

568 Pascal writes: "There are only two kinds of men: the righteous who believe themselves sinners; the rest, sinners, who believe themselves righteous." (Pascal: *Penseés*, p. 194.)

569 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 10.7–8.

570 Aurelius: *Meditations*, book IV. 39, p. 30.

571 Ibid., book VII. 71, p. 194.

572 Descartes: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 1: p. 122ff.

573 Ibid., 3: pp. 257f.

574 Engelmann: *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir*, p. 74.

575 Ibid., p. 79.

576 Wittgenstein: *Notebooks* 1914–1916, dated 11.6.16.

577 Ibid., dated 8.7.16.

578 Ibid., dated 13.8.16.

579 Ibid., dated 13.8.16.

580 Wittgenstein: *Culture and Value*, p. 45e.

581 Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*, § 124.

582 Wittgenstein: *Culture and Value*, p. 43e.

583 Aurelius: *Meditations*, book VII. 26, p. 60.

584 Romans 1:32.

585 Pascal: *Provincial Letters*, p. 249.

586 Kant: *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 238.

587 Kant: *The Conflict of the Faculties*, p. 288.

588 Kant: *Critique of Judgment*, § 3, p. 39.

589 Kant distinguishes between philosophy as a school and philosophy's relevance to the world. Furthermore, Kant's philosophical endeavors were not undertaken as academic philosophy operating for its own sake (Kant: *Logic*, pp. 27f., cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A838f./B866f.).

590 Heller: "The Legacy of Marxian Ethics," p. 140.

591 A person is free if he exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another, Aristotle argues. (*Metaphysics*, 982b25, p. 9.) Unfortunately, Aristotle did not recognize that this principle applied to all human beings, and considered some people to be born slaves. Slaves are not accorded the same freedom as others: they do not have an individual *praxis*, but are tools for their owners' *praxis*.

592 Hume: *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, p. 229.

593 Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 408.

594 Ibid., pp. 401ff.

595 Freud: *Civilization and its Discontents*, p. 74.

596 Torture has been widespread for thousands of years. It isn't mentioned in antique Babylonian or Jewish texts, but both the Assyrians and the Egyptians made use of torture, and it was an everyday part of life for the Greeks and the Romans. In Aristophanes' comedy *The Frogs*, for instance, there are descriptions of numerous forms of torture. Then, for the Inquisition, torture wasn't just a legitimate practice—it was a holy exercise meant to snatch a person

out of Satan's claws. Up until the late eighteenth century, in fact, torture was common practice in most European countries. Prussia was the first nation to outlaw all torture, in 1754, and most European countries quickly followed suite. (Switzerland was the last country to hop on the bandwagon a hundred or so years later.) However, as Amnesty International has shown since they began their campaign against torture in 1973, torture has hardly disappeared from Europe.

Descriptions of torture tend to focus on the more obscure methods, but even the simplest can cause the same amount of pain. You can systematically beat someone. You can deny prisoners sleep and food or make them stand upright for long periods, which results in intense muscle pain. You can also shame your victims, for example by forcing them to eat an interrogator's snot or making them wear women's underwear on their heads. After that, different methods can be employed to break the prisoners mentally—for example by making them think they're going to be executed. These methods aren't as spectacular as the more medieval methods of torture, but can be just as effective. On top of this, they leave few physical traces behind. Torture is in violation of Article 5 in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UN Convention Against Torture in 1984 also prohibits all use of torture, defined as any action that consciously inflicts serious physical or mental harm on a person for the sake of punishing (excepting lawful cases of punishment), humiliating, or extracting information from the victim. One hundred and nineteen countries ratified the convention, and all pledged to punish any person who had carried out torture within their county's borders. The problem, however, is that the countries that did and do extensively use torture either did not

ratify the convention or simply refuse to cooperate with the ongoing efforts of the Committee Against Torture.

597 Cf. Conroy: *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People*, pp. 27f.

598 Ibid., pp. 20f.

599 Goldhagen: *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, p. 119.

600 Staub: *The Roots of Evil*, p. 158.

601 In contrast to the usual assumption that the Allies neglected the Jews and could have saved a multitude of Jews from the extermination camps, William D. Rubenstein (*The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Save More Jews from the Nazis*) has shown in detail that this was not a practical possibility.

602 Katz: *Seductions of Crime*, p. 20.

603 Darley and Latané: "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility."

604 Cf. Hochschild: *King Leopold's Ghost*.

605 Cf. Arendt: *Crises of the Republic*, p. 88.

606 Contrary to what you'd expect, an extensive investigation showed that people generally have a more pronounced feeling of guilt with regard to unpremeditated actions than to premeditated actions. (McGraw: "Guilt Following Transgression: An Attribution of Responsibility Approach.") The explanation for this is that premeditated actions already seem justified *before* they are carried out, and the agent, therefore, does not need to feel guilt, while unpremeditated actions do not necessarily appear justified afterward. Of course, agents will often try to rationalize their actions after the fact, and thereby spare themselves some humiliation.

607 Why do we punish offenders? Typically, we come up with two explanations: (1) prevention and (2) retribution. Most contemporary theories of punishment tend in the direction of the first,

but in my opinion, punishment should be something more serious, something more substantial than an all-around preventative. On the other hand, while it's understandable that a victim wants revenge, I don't think that thoughts of revenge should *legitimate* punishment . . . we should remember that there is an essential difference between pure revenge and punishment motivated by a concern for justice: (1) Punishment is "repayment" for an evil, while revenge is based on causing suffering; (2) punishment sets limits on the amount of "payback" that can be taken, while revenge is never proportional and has a tendency to escalate; (3) revenge is personal, but what is "repaid" by punishment doesn't have to have such personal overtones; and (4) revenge implies personal satisfaction at the sight of another's suffering—that is, revenge has an emotional aspect that punishment (ideally) lacks. Of course, it should be stated that it's not always easy to distinguish between revenge and punishment, but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't take pains to distinguish between the two. Hegel has given perhaps the most purely retributive justification of punishment: his theory states that a crime must always be punished, because the crime is a breach of justice—and, furthermore, that any possible beneficial consequences of punishment (for example, preventative effects) are chance occurrences and are utterly irrelevant to its legitimization (*Philosophy of Right*, § 99f.). Hegel expresses this idea quite strongly, insisting that a criminal *must* be punished, since by infringing on someone else's rights, the criminal has agreed to let his own rights be infringed upon. Punishment is the negation of a negation. The criminal's negative action should be annulled by subjecting him to a correspondingly negative action. Ideally, this process should annul the crime and provide the criminal with a new ethical grounding.

608 There are a number of juridical, political, and moral problems regarding the function and the legitimization of such war crimes tribunals. For a clear discussion of these problems, see Nino: *Radical Evil on Trial.*

609 Micah 4:3.

610 Joel 3:10.

611 Weber: "Politics as Vocation" in *Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations*, p. 197.

612 Ibid., p. 198.

613 See especially Matthew 5:39: "Do not resist an evil person." See also Romans 12:21.

614 See especially Psalms 37.

615 Immanuel Kant: "On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns."

616 Weber: "Politics as Vocation" in *Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations*, p. 199.

617 Concerning the idea of a "moral algorithm" and fact that it doesn't exist, see O'Neill: *Constructions of Reason.*

618 Cf. Robertson: *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 440.

619 For a discussion of "weak consequentialism," see Barry: *Liberty and Justice*, p. 40–77.

620 Ibid., p. 76.

621 Hegel: *Natural Law* p. 79. Cf. Hegel: *Philosophy of Right*, § 135.

622 Hegel: *Natural Law*, p. 80.

623 Cf. Castoriadis: *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*, p. 120. The reference to *Antigone* is in verse 707ff.

624 Sorel: *Reflections on Violence.*

625 Fanon: *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 50.

626 Cf. Keane: *Reflections on Violence*, p. 88.

627 Ibid., p. 90.

628 On the development of the monopoly on violence, see Elias: *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*.

629 Weber: "Politics as Vocation" in *Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations*, p. 156.

630 Arendt: *Crisis of the Republic*, p. 177. Arendt distinguishes sharply between power and violence. Power implies popular support, whereas violence largely occurs without such support. According to Arendt, power by definition belongs to a group, but violence can originate in a single individual. She admits that the two are often linked, but insists on the distinction, because the essential question is what *type* of power lies behind each individual instance of violence (ibid., p. 146). The essential question with regard to political violence is whether the violence has a *legitimate* power base behind it. We can even say that there is an inversely proportional relationship between the power base and the extent of the violence. This is illustrated by the Soviet terror of the 1930s: It was clear to the Central Committee that they didn't have the popular support they wanted, and they therefore drew the conclusion that they were threatened from all sides. A government that finds it necessary to arrest people who pose absolutely no threat—for example, students in small, insignificant towns—lacks security. These actions can be blamed on the implicit recognition that the power base is poor, that the government doesn't have enough support from the people as a whole. Violence is therefore a compensation for power. Of course, the power base may have been weak, but there's no reason to believe that there was any organized, domestic opposition after 1932 (cf. Getty and Naumov: *The Road to Terror*, p. 574). Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks weren't threatened by internal enemies, the Party felt itself to be steadily more threatened and regarded

all of their measures as "defensive." If only the Bolsheviks would have followed the rather more humble use of violence advocated by Machiavelli: strong, but short-lived. Totalitarian violence is almost without exception a "poor use of violence." And yet, from Arendt's perspective, Machiavelli's model doesn't work either. It's desirable that violence have as broad a power base as possible, because this minimizes the extent of the violence. The weaker the power base, however, the stronger the tendency that violence will increase, and this increase in violence only undermines the power base even more—with the result that we've taken a step in the direction of pure terror. A government structured around terror has little power, but always tends toward violence—though this type of violence doesn't gain the government any power, and can even undermine it (Arendt: *Crises of the Republic*, p. 155; cf. *Vita Activa*, p. 187). To governments built on terror, violence will have an inherent worth. That is, violence loses the instrumental character it has in governments who enjoy a larger power base. Arendt thus concludes that instead of stabilizing power, violence typically leads to more violence.

631 For a good discussion of the relationship between "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing," see Naimark: *Fires of Hatred*, pp. 2ff.

632 "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment . . ."

633 Cited in Keane: *Reflections on Violence*, p. 157.

634 For a discussion of this problem, see Ignatieff: *The Warrior's Honor*, p. 18, 109–63. See also William Shawcross: *Deliver Us From Evil*.

635 Ogata: "Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action," p. 275.

636 Cf. Seifert: "The Second Front."

637 The following remarks about rape in war are mainly based on Seifert, ibid.

638 Clausewitz: *On War*, pp. 127f.

639 Cf. Scarry: *The Body in Pain*, p. 61.

640 Seifert: "The Second Front," p. 150.

641 Mann: *Diaries 1919–1939*, dated August 13, 1936.

642 Adorno: *Negative Dialectics*, p. 380.

643 Cf. Morgenthau: *Politics among Nations*.

644 Kant: *Toward Perpetual Peace* in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings*, pp. 91f. See also Rawls: *The Law of Peoples*, p. 36.

645 Cf. Rawls: *The Law of Peoples*, § 10.

646 Walzer: *Just and Unjust Wars*.

647 For a good overview of this tradition, see Johnson: *The Just war Tradition and the Restraint of War*.

648 Augustine: *City of God*, book XIX. 11–13.

649 Military advocates evaluated every single bombing target (cf. Ignatieff: *Virtual War*, p. 197–201.) A few things went wrong—for example, the bombing of the Chinese embassy, a train filled with civilians, a refugee convoy, a Serbian nursing home, etc.—but for the most part, NATO seems to have done its utmost to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets. A single instance, a television station in Beograd where ten to fifteen civilians were killed, appears to have been a gray zone, but the station also had a military use and can therefore be regarded as a legitimate bombing target. In contrast, it's doubtful that bombing from such great distance—a strategy the United States has used in multiple wars in the last century—is legitimate when it necessarily results in extensive loss to the civilian population.

650 Cf. Ignatieff: *Virtual War*, p. 72.

651 Habermas: "Bestiality and Humanity."

652 Cf. Kahn: "War and Sacrifice in Kosovo."

653 Baudrillard: *The Perfect Crime*, p. 141.

654 Rawls: "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," p. 518.

655 Popper: *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume One: The Spell of Plato*, chap. 9.

656 Popper: *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 361.

657 Hampshire: *Innocence and Experience*, p. 90.

658 Rawls: *A Theory of Justice*, p. 98.

659 Rawls: *The Law of Peoples*, § 16.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Marilyn McCord. *Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1999.

Adams, Marilyn McCord and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds. *The Problem of Evil*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990.

Adorno, Theodor W. "Education After Auschwitz," in Rolf Tiedemann, ed.: *Can One Live After Auschwitz?* Trans. Rodney Livingstone, et. al. Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003.

—. *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*. Trans. E. F. N. Jephcott. Verso, New York 2005.

—. *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E. B. Ashton. Seabury Press, New York 1979.

Airaksinen, Timo. *The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade*. Routledge, New York 1995.

Alford, C. Fred. *What Evil Means to Us*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1997.

Allison, Henry E. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990.

Alouni, Tayseer. "Transcript of Bin Laden's October Interview." CNN. 16 Nov. 2009 <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html>.

Aly, Götz. *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State*. Trans. Jefferson Chase. Metropolitan Books, New York 2006.

Amis, Martin. *London Fields*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1990.

Andersen, Hans Christian. "The Snow Queen," in Jackie Wullschläger, ed.: *Hans Christian Andersen: Fairy Tales*. Trans. Tiina Nunnally. Penguin, New York 2004.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, New York 1991.

Anderson-Gold, Sharon. "Kant's Rejection of Devilishness: The Limits of Human Volition." *Idealistic Studies* 14, 1984.

Anissimov, Myrian. *Primo Levi: Tragedy of an Optimist*. Trans. Steve Cox. Aurum Press, London 1998.

Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros., New York 1948.

Arendt, Hannah. *Crises of the Republic*. Harcourt Brace, New York 1972.

—. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1994.

—. *The Life of the Mind*. Harcourt Brace, New York 1977.

—. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Harcourt Brace, New York 1979.

—. *Vita Activa*, in Peter Baehr, ed.: *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, Penguin, New York 2000.

Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. Penguin, New York 1998.

—. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. David Ross. Oxford University Press, New York 1998.

—. *The Politics*. Trans. T. A. Sinclair. Penguin, New York 1992.

Athens, Lonnie. *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*. University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1997.

Augustine. *The City of God against the Pagans*. Trans. R. W. Dyson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.

—. *Confessions*. Trans. Henry Chadwick. Oxford University Press, New York 1991.

—. *The Essential Augustine*, Vernon J. Burke, ed. Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis 1981.

Aurelius, Marcus. *Meditations*. Trans. R. B. Rutherford. Oxford University Press, New York 1998.

Barker, Kenneth L, ed. NIV Bible. Zondervan, Grand Rapids 2002.

Baron, Robert A. *Human Aggression*. Plenum Press, New York 1977.

Barry, Brian. *Liberty and Justice*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991.

Bataille, Georges. *Literature and Evil*. Trans. Alastair Hamilton. Marion Boyars, London 1997.

Baudelaire, Charles. *Baudelaire: Poems*. Trans. Richard Howard. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1993.

—. *The Prose Poems and La Fanfarlo*. Trans. Rosemary Lloyd. The Oxford University Press, New York 2001.

Baudrillard, Jean. *Fatal Strategies*. Trans. Jim Fleming. Semiotext(e), New York 1990.

—. *The Perfect Crime*. Trans. Chris Turner. Verso, London 1996.

—. *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*. Trans. James Benedict. Verso, New York 1993.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2000.

Baumeister, Roy F. *Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence*. W. H. Freeman and Company, New York 1999.

Becker, Ernest. *Escape from Evil*. The Free Press, New York 1975.

Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Hannah Arendt, ed.: *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*. Trans. Harry Zohn. Harcourt Brace, New York 1968.

Berkowitz, Leonard. *Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences, and Control*. McGraw-Hill, New York 1993.

Bjørnvig, Thorkild. *Den æstetiske idiosynkrasi*. Cappelen, Oslo 1960. (Quotation trans. Kerri A. Pierce.)

Blake, William. *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake.* Doubleday, New York 1988.

Blumenthal, David R. "Theodicy: Dissonance in Theory and Practice," in Hermann Häring and David Tracy, eds.: *The Fascination of Evil.* SCM Press, London 1998.

Boethius. *Consolation of Philosophy.* Trans. Joel C. Relihan. Hackett, Indianapolis 2001.

Bohrer, Karl Heinz. *Nach der Natur: Über Politik und Ästhetik.* Hanser, München 1988.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Letters and Papers from Prison: The Enlarged Edition.* Trans. Reginald Fuller, Frank Clark, et. al. Simon & Schuster, New York 1997.

Boom, Allan. "Introduction," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *Emile, or On Education.* Trans. Allan Bloom. Basic Books, New York 1979.

Bourke, Joanna. *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare.* Granta Books, London 1999.

Brecher, Bob. "Understanding the Holocaust. The Uniqueness Debate." *Radical Philosophy* 96, 1999.

Breidert, Wolfgang, ed. *Die Erschütterung der vollkommenen Welt: Die Wirkung des Erdbebens von Lissabon im Spiegel der europäischer Zeitgenossen.* Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1994.

Browning, Christopher R. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland.* HarperCollins, New York 1998.

Calvin, Jean. *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader.* Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Camus, Albert. *The Plague.* Trans. Stuart Gilbert. Vintage Books, New York 1991.

Castoriadis, Corneslis. *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991.

Cenkner, William, ed. *Evil and the Response of World Religion.* Paragon House, St. Paul 1997.

Cesarini, David. *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a "Desk Murderer."* Da Capo Press, Cambridge MA 2006.

Cioran, E. M. *Drawn and Quartered.* Trans. Richard Howard. Arcade Publishing, New York 1998.

—. *On the Heights of Despair*. Trans. I. Zarifopol-Johnston. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1982.

Cohn, Norman. *Europe's Inner Demons: The Demonization of Christians in Medieval Christendom*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2000.

Conrad, Joseph. *Heart of Darkness*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1985.

Conroy, John. *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture*. Knopf, New York 2000.

"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." Human Rights Web. 16 Nov. 2009 <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>.

Courtois, Stéphane, Nicholas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean Louis Margolin. *The Black Book of Communism*. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1999.

Cruikshank, Barbara. "Revolutions Within: Self-Government and Self-Esteem," in Andrew Barry et al., eds.: *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996.

Darley, John M. and Bibb Latané. "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 8, 1968.

Davenport-Hines, Richard. *Gothic: 400 years of Excess, Horror, Evil and Ruin*. Fourth Estate, London 1998.

Davidson, Donald: "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?", in *Essays on Actions and Events*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982.

Delbanco, Andrew. *The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1995.

Descartes, René. *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in *Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings*. Trans. Desmond M. Clark. Penguin, New York 1998.

—. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1. Trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.

—. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 3. Trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. *The Brothers Karamasov*. Trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew. Bantam Books, New York 2003.

—. "Environment," in *A Writer's Diary: Volume 1, 1873–1876*. Trans. Kenneth Lantz. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1994.

—. "Pushkin (A Sketch)," in *A Writer's Diary: Volume 2, 1877–1881*. Trans. Kenneth Lantz. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 2000.

—. *Selected Letters of Fyodor Dostoevsky*. Trans. Andrew R. MacAndres. Joseph Frank and David I. Goldstein, eds. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick 1987.

Duckitt, John. *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. Praeger Publishers, Westport CT 1992.

Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford 2000.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. *The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. The Modern Library, New York 2000.

Engelmann, Paul. *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir*, B. F. McGuinness, ed. Blackwell, Oxford 1967.

Euripides. *Orestes and Other Plays*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press, New York 2001.

Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Trans. Richard Philcox. Grove, New York 2004.

Ferry, Luc. *Man Made God: The Meaning of Life*. Trans. David Pellauer. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2002.

Finkelstein, Norman G. and Bettina Birn. *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth*. Henry Holt and Company, New York 1998.

Forges, Alison des. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. Human Rights Watch, New York 1999.

Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Trans. and ed. James Strachey. W. W. Norton & Company, New York 1989.

Gaita, Raimond. *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice*. Routledge, New York 2000.

Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6:3, 1969.

Gauchet, Marcel. *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*. Trans. Oscar Burge. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1997.

Gelven, Michael. *The Risk of Being: What It Means to Be Good and Bad*. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park PA 1997.

Genet, Jean. *The Thief's Journal*. Trans. B. Frechtman. Olympia Press, Paris 2008.

Getty, J. Arch and Oleg V. Naumov. *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–39*. Yale University Press, New Haven 1999.

Gibbon, Edward. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume V: Justinian and the Roman Law*. The Folio Society, London 1998.

Gillespie, Michael Allan. *Nihilism Before Nietzsche*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998.

Glass, James M. *"Life Unworthy of Life": Racial Phobia and Mass Murder in Hitler's Germany*. Basic Books, New York 1997.

Glover, Jonathan. *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2000.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *Goethe's Faust*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. Anchor Books, New York 1990.

Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. Abacus, London 1999.

Gourevitch, Philip. *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York 1998.

Grant, Ruth W. *Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1997.

Griffin, David. *God, Power and Evil*. Westminster Press, Philadelphia 1976.

Gutman, Roy and David Rieff, eds. *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York 1999.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border Between Legaity and Morality." *Constellations* 6:3, 1999.

Hampshire, Stuart. *Innocence and Experience*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1989.

Hamsun, Knut: *Fra det ubevidste Sjæleliv*. Gyldendal, Oslo 1994. (Quotation trans. Kerri A. Pierce.)

Hare, Robert D. *Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths among Us*, Guilford Press, London 1999.

Häring, Hermann and David Tracy, eds. *The Fascination of Evil.* SCM Press, London 1998.

Harris, Thomas. *The Silence of the Lambs*. St. Martin's Press, New York 1988.

Hegel, G. W. F. *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*. Trans. T. F. Geraets, et. al. Hackett, Indianapolis, 1991.

—. *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume I.* Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998.

—. *Natural Law*. Trans. T.M. Knox. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1975.

—. *The Philosophy of History*. Trans. J. Sibree. Dover Publications, New York 2004.

—. *Philosophy of Right*. Trans. S. W. Dyde. Dover Publications, Mineola, 2005.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper & Row, New York 1962.

—. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Trans. Parvis Ernad and Kenneth Maly. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1989.

—. *Feldweg-Gespräche, Gesamtausgabe Band 77*. Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1989.

—. *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken," Gesamtausgabe Band 52*. Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1982.

—. *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1996.

Heller, Agnes. "The Legacy of Marxian Ethics," in A. Heller & F. Feher, eds.: *The Grandeur and Twilight of Radical Universalism*. New Brunswick 1987.

Heraclitus. *Fragments*. Trans. Brooks Haxton. Penguin, New York 2003.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. *Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind*. Trans. Ioannis D. Evrigenis and Daniel Pellerin. Hackett, Indianapolis 2004.

Hick, John. *Evil and the God of Love*. Harper and Row, New York 1978.

Hitler, Adolf. *Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944. His Private Conversations*. Trans. Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens. Enigma Books, New York 2000.

—. *Mein Kampf*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Houghton Mifflin, New York 1999.

Hobbes, Thomas. *De Cive*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983.

—. *Leviathan*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.

Hochschild, Adam. *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. Papermac, London 2000.

Hollander, Paul. "Revisiting the 'Banality of Evil': Political Violence in Communist Systems," in *Partisan Review* 1, 1997.

Honderich, Ted. *Violence for Equality: Inquiries in Political Philosophy*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1980.

Höss, Rudolf. *Commandant of Auschwitz: The Autobiography of Rudolf Höss*. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon. Phoenix Press, London 2000.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ed. *The Evidential Argument from Evil*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1996.

Hume, David. *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989.

—. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1984.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. Vintage, London 2001.

—. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. Henry Holt and Company, New York 1997.

Irlenborn, Bernd. *Der Ingrimm des Aufruhrs: Heidegger und das Problem des Bösen*. Passagen Verlag, Vienna 2000.

Jaspers, Karl. *Von der Wahrheit*. Piper, Munich 1947.

Johnson, Eric and Karl-Heinz Reuband. *What We Knew. Terror, Mass Murder and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany*. John Murray, London 2005.

Johnson, James T. *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1981.

Kahn, Paul W. "War and Sacrifice in Kosovo," *Philosophy and Public Policy* 19:2/3, 1999.

Kant, Immanuel. "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" Trans. David L. Colclasure, in Pauline Kleingeld, ed.: *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006.

—. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Robert B. Louden, in Gunter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, eds.: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.

—. *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Trans. Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, eds.: *Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005.

—. "Conjectural Beginning of Human History." Trans. David L. Colclasure. In Pauline Kleingeld, ed.: *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2006.

—. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. J. H. Bernard. Dover Publications, Mineola 2005.

—. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. In Allen W. Wood, ed.: *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996.

—. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. and trans. Marcus Weigelt. Penguin, New York 2007.

—. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Thomas K. Abbott. In Allen W. Wood, ed.: *Basic Writings of Kant*. The Modern Library, New York 2001.

—. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective." Trans. David L. Colclasure. In Pauline Kleingeld, ed.: *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2006.

—. *Lectures on Ethics*. Trans. Peter Heath. J. B. Schneewind, ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

—. *Lectures on Pedagogy*. Trans. Robert B. Louden. In Gunter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, eds.: *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.

—. *Logic*. Trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz. Dover Publications, New York 1988.

—. *Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. In Allen W. Wood, ed.: *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996.

—. "On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Praxis." Trans. N. S. Nisbet, in H. S. Reiss, ed.: *Political Writings*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.

—. "On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy." Trans. George di Giovanni. In Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood,

eds.: *Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005.

—. "On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns." Trans. James W. Ellington. In *Ethical Philosophy*. Hackett, Indianapolis 1994.

—. *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*. In *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, bind XIV, Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften ed. de Gruyter, Berlin 1902.

—. *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*. In *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, bind XIV, Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften ed. de Gruyter, Berlin 1902.

—. *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. HarperCollins, New York 2008.

—. "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind." Trans. N. S. Nisbet. In H. S. Reiss, ed.: *Political Writings*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.

—. *Toward Perpetual Peace*. Trans. David L. Colclasure. In Pauline Kleingeld, ed.: *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Yale University Press, New Haven 2006.

—. *Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, i *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, bind XXIII, Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften ed. de Gruyter, Berlin 1902.

Kapuściński, Ryszard. *The Soccer War*. Trans. William Brand. Vintage Books. New York 1992.

Katz, Fred E. *Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil*. State University of New York Press, Albany 1993.

Katz, Jack. *Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil*. Basic Books, New York 1988.

Keane, John. *Reflections on Violence*. Verso, New York 1996.

Keats, John. "To George and Georgina Keats, February 14 to May 8, 1819," in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*. Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Kekes, John. *Facing Evil*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1990.

Kittsteiner, Heinz Dieter. "Die Abschaffung des Teufels im 18. Jahrundert. Ein kulturhistorisches Ereignis und seine Folgen," in Alexander Schuller und Wolfgang von Rahden, eds. *Die andere Kraft: Zur Renaissance des Bösen*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1993.

Koselleck, Reinhard. "Zur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriffe," in *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Se mantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1979.

Lacroix, Michel. *Das Böse*. Trans. Thomas Laugstien. BLT, Bergisch Gladbach 1999.

Lactantius. *The Wrath of God*. Trans. Sister Mary Frances McDonald, in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*. Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Lang, Berel. *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990.

Lang, Jochen von and Claus Sibyll, eds. *Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police*. Da Capo Press, New York 1999.

Lautréamont, Comte de. *Maldoror and Poems*. Trans. Paul Knight. Penguin, New York, 1978.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*. Trans. E. M. Huggard. Open Court, Chicago 1985.

Leopardi, Giacomo. *The Canti with a Selection of His Prose*. Trans. J. G. Nichols. Routledge, New York 2003.

—. "Memorable Sayings of Filippo Ottonieri." Trans. Giovanni Ceccetti, in *Operette Morali: Essays and Dialogues*. University of California Press, Berkeley 1982.

Lerner, M. *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion*. Plenum Press, New York 1980.

Levi, Primo. *The Drowned and the Saved*. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. Vintage, New York 1989.

—. "Introduction." Trans. Joachim Neugroschel, in Rudolf Höss: *Commandant of Auschwitz: The Autobiography of Rudolf Höss*. Phoenix Press, London 2000.

Levinas, Emmanuel. *Humanism of the Other*. Trans. Nidra Poller. University of Illinois Press, Urbana 2006.

—. *Of God Who Comes to Mind*. Trans. Bettina Bergo. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1998.

—. "Useless Suffering." Trans. Richard Cohen, in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*. Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Leyhausen, Paul et. al. *Krieg oder Frieden*. Piper, Munich 1970.

Lifton, Robert J. *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. Basic Books, New York 1986.

Lissman, Konrad Paul, ed. *Fascination des Bösen: Über die Abgründe des Menschlichen*. Paul Zsolnay Verlag, Vienna 1997.

Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *Discourses*. Trans. Peter Bondenella and Mark Muse. Penguin, Harmondsworth 1979.

Mackie, John. "Evil and Omnipotence," in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds.: *The Problem of Evil*. Oxford University Press, New York 1990.

Mann, Thomas. *Diaries 1918–1939*. Trans. C. Winston and R. Winston. Hermann Kesten, ed. André Deutsch, London 1983.

—. "The Problem of Freedom: An Address to the Undergraduates and Faculty of Rutgers University at Convocation on April the 28th, 1939." Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1939.

Marquard, Odo. *In Defense of the Accidental: Philosophical Studies*. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. Oxford University Press, New York 1991.

Masters, Brian. *The Evil That Men Do*. Doubleday, London 1996.

May, Rollo. *Power and Innocence: A Search for the Sources of Violence*. Norton, New York 1972.

McGinn, Bernard. *Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil*. Columbia University Press, New York 2000.

McGinn, Colin. *Ethics, Evil, and Fiction*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997.

McGraw, Kathleen M. "Guilt Following Transgression: An Attribution of Responsibility Approach." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53, 1987.

Melville, Herman. *Billy Budd and Other Stories*. Penguin, New York 1986.

Midgley, Mary. *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay*. Routledge, New York 2001.

Milgram, Stanley. *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. Harper & Row, New York 1974.

Mill, John Stuart. *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Milton, John. *Paradise Lost*, Penguin, London 2000.

Montaigne, Michel de. "On Cruelty," in *The Essays: A Selection*. Trans. M.A. Screech. Penguin, New York 2003.

Morgenthau, Hans. "Love and Power," in *Commentary* 33, 1962.

—. *Politics among Nations*. Knopf, New York 1948.

Morris, David B. "The Plot of Suffering: AIDS and Evil," in Jennifer L. Geddes, ed.: *Evil After Postmodernism*. Routledge, Lon- New York 2001.

Nagel, Thomas. *Mortal Questions*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979.

Naimark, Norman M. *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2001.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *The Experience of Freedom*. Trans. Bridget McDonald. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. Vintage Books, New York 1989.

—. *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884–1885*, in *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Bd. 11, dtv/de Gruyter, Berlin 1988.

—. *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885–1887*, in *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Bd. 12, dtv/de Gruyter, Berlin 1988.

—. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford University Press, New York 1996.

—. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin, New York, 2003.

—. *Writings from the Late Notebooks*. Trans. Kate Sturge. Rüdiger Bittner, ed. Cambridge University Press, New York 2003.

Nino, Carlos Santiago. *Radical Evil on Trial*. Yale University Press, New Haven 1996.

Norris, Joel. *Serial Killers. The Growing Menace*. Doubleday, New York 1988.

Novalis. *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia*. Trans. David W. Wood. State University of New York Press, Albany 2007.

—. *Schriften, Band 2, Das Philosophisch-theoretische Werk*. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1999.

Ofstad, Harald. *Our Contempt for Weakness: Nazi Norms and Values—and Our Own*. Trans. C. von Sydow. Almquist & Wiksell International, Stockholm 1989.

Ogata, Sadako. "Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action," in Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, eds.: *The Globalization Reader*, Blackwell, Oxford 2000.

O'Neill, Onora. *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989.

Oppenheimer, Paul. *Evil and the Demonic: A New Theory of Monstrous Behaviour*. New York University Press, New York 1996.

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876–1912*. Random House, New York 1991.

Parkin, David, ed. *The Anthropology of Evil*. Blackwell, Oxford 1985.

Pascal, Blaise. *Penseés and Other Writings*. Trans. Honor Levi. Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.

—. *The Provincial Letters*. Trans. Thomas M'Crie. BiblioBazaar, Charleston 2009.

Pauen, Michael. *Pessimismus: Geschichtsphilosophie, Metaphysik und Moderne von Nietzsche bis Spengler*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1997.

Plack, Arno. *Die Gesellschaft und Das Böse: Eine Kritik der herrschenden Moral*. Fischer, Frankfurt a. M. 1991.

Plantinga, Alvin. *The Nature of Necessity*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1974.

Plato. *Gorgias*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press, New York 1994.

—. *Meno and Other Dialogues*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005.

—. *Philebus*. Trans. Dorothea Frede. Hackett, Indianapolis 1993.

—. *Protagoras*. Trans. C. C. W. Taylor. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002.

—. *The Republic*. Trans. G. M. A. Grube. Hackett, Indianapolis 1992.

—. *Timaeus*. Trans. Peter Kalkavage. Focus Publishing, Newburyport 2001.

Plotinus. *The Enneads*. Trans. Stephen MacKenna. Paul Brunton, New York 1992.

Poe, Edgar Allen. *The Complete Illustrated Stories and Poems*. Chancellor Press, London 1994.

Pope, Alexander. *The Poems of Alexander Pope*. John Butt, ed. Yale University Press, New Haven 1963.

Popper, Karl R. *Conjectures and Refutations*. Routledge, London 1989.

—. *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume One: The Spell of Plato*. Routledge, London 2005.

Portmann, John. *When Bad Things Happen to Other People*. Routledge, New York 2000.

Pressac, Jean-Claude. *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers*. The Holocaust History Project. 16 Nov. 2009 <http://www.holocaust-history.org/auschwitz/pressac/technique-and-operation/pressac0005.shtml>.

Pseudo-Dionysius. *On the Divine Names*. Trans. John D. Jones, in Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*. Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

Rapp, Friedrich. *Fortschritt: Entwicklung und Sinngehalt einer philosophischen Idee*. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1992.

Rawls, John. "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in *Journal of Philosophy* 77:9, 1980.

—. *The Law of Peoples*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1999.

—. *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1971.

Ricoeur, Paul. *The Conflict of Interpretations*. Don Ihde, ed. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1974.

—. *Fallible Man*. Trans. Charles A. Kelbley. Fordham University Press, New York 2000.

—. *The Symbolism of Evil*. Trans. Emerson Buchanan. Beacon Press, Boston 1969.

Robertson, Geoffrey. *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*. Penguin, Harmondsworth 2000.

Rochefoucauld, François de La. *Maxims*. Trans. Leonard Tancock. Penguin, New York 1959.

Rosenbaum, Ron. *Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil*. HarperCollins, New York 1999.

Rosenkranz, Karl. *Ästhetik des Häßlichen*. Reclam, Leipzig 1990.

Rosenthal, Abigail L. *A Good Look at Evil*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1987.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *A Discourse on Inequality*. Trans. Maurice Cranston. Penguin, New York 1984.

—. *Emile, or On Education*. Trans. Allan Bloom. Basic Books, New York 1979.

—. "Letter from J.-J. Rousseau to Mr. de Voltaire, August 18, 1756." Trans. Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, Christopher Kelly, and Terence Marshall. In Mark Larrimore, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: A Reader*. Blackwell, Oxford 2001.

—. *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*. Trans. Peter France. Penguin, New York, 1979.

Rowe, William L. "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Ad-

ams, eds.: *The Problem of Evil*. Oxford University Press, New York 1990.

Rubenstein, William D. *The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis*. Routledge, New York 1997.

Russell, Jeffrey Burton. *The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1977.

—. *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1984.

—. *Mephistopheles: The Devil in the Modern World*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1986.

—. *The Prince of Darkness: Radical Evil and Power of Good in History*. Cornell University Press, Ithaka/London 1988.

—. *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1981.

Sade, Donatien-Alphonse-François de. *Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom and other writings*. Trans. Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse. Grove Press, New York 1965.

Sæterbakken, Stig. *Det onde øye*. Cappelen, Oslo 2001. (Quotation trans. Kerri A. Pierce.)

Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Baudelaire*. Trans. Martin Turnell. New Directions, New York 1967.

Scarry, Elaine. *The Body in Pain: The Making and the Unmaking of the World*. Oxford University Press, New York 1985.

Schelling, F. W. J. *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*. Trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. State University of New York, Albany 2006.

Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*. Trans. George Schwab. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *On the Basis of Morality*. Trans. Arthur Brodrick Bullock. McMillan, New York 1915.

—. *Parerga and Paralipomena: Volume II*. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1974.

—. *The World as Will and Representation: Volume I*. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Dover Publications, Mineola 1966.

—. *The World as Will and Representation: Volume. II*. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Dover Publications, Mineola 1966.

Schrader, Wolfgang H. *Ethik nd Anthropologie in der englischen Aufklärung: Der Wandel der moral-sense-Theorie von Schaftesbury bis Hume*. Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1984.

Schuller, Alexander and Wolfgang von Rahden, eds. *Die andere Kraft: Zur Renaissance des Bösen*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1993.

Seifert, Ruth. "The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars," in Manfred B. Steger and Nancy S. Lind, eds.: *Violence and Its Alternatives: An Interdisciplinary Reader*. Macmillan, London 1999.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. *Dialogues and Essays*. Trans. John Davie. Oxford University Press, New York 2007.

Sereny, Gitta. *Into that Darkness: An Examination of Conscience*. Vintage Books, New York 1983.

Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet*, Sylvan Barnet, ed. New American Library, New York 1998.

Shawcross, William. *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*. Simon & Schuster, New York 2000.

Smith, Adam. *The Wealth of Nations*. The Modern Library, New York 2000.

Sofsky, Wolfgang. *Traktat über die Gewalt*, Fischer. Frankfurt a. M. 1996.

Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. *The Gulag Archipelago*. Trans. Thomas P. Whitney. Harper and Row, New York 1975.

Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*. Jeremy Jennings, ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

Spinoza, Baruch. *The Ethics and Selected Letters*. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Hackett, Indianapolis 1982.

Staub, Ervin. *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989.

Stump, Eleonore. "Knowledge, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil," in Michael L. Peterson, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings*. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1992.

Svendsen, Lars. *The Philosophy of Boredom*. Trans. John Irons. Reaktion Books, London 2005.

Swinburne, Richard. *The Existence of God*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991.

—. "Natural Evil," in Michael L. Peterson, ed.: *The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings*. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1992.

Todorov, Tzvetan. *Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps*. Trans. Arthur Denner and Abigail Pollack. Phoenix Press, London 2000.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh. *The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Penguin, New York, 1969.

Vetlesen, Arne Johan. "Ondskap i Bosnia," in *Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift* 1/2, 1997.

Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet de. *Candide, or Optimism*. Trans. Theo Cuffe. London, Penguin 2005.

Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Basic Books, New York 1977.

Watson, Lyall. *Dark Nature: A Natural History of Evil*. HarperCollins, New York 1995.

—. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.* Trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Routledge, London 2001.

Weber, Max. *Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations.* Trans. Gordon C. Wells. John Dreijmanis, ed. Algora Publishing, New York 2008.

Weil, Simone. *Gravity and Grace.* Trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr. Routledge, New York 2008.

—. "The Power of Words." Trans. Richard Rees, in Siân Miles, ed.: *Simone Weil: An Anthology.* Grove Press, New York 1986.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Culture and Value.* Trans. Peter Winch. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984.

—. *Notebooks 1914–1916: 2nd Edition.* Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979.

—. *Philosophical Investigations: 2nd Edition.* Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. Blackwell Publishers, Malden 1999.

Xenophon. *The Memorabilia.* Trans. H. G. Dakyns. BiblioBazaar, Charleston 2007.

Lars Svendsen is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bergen, Norway. He is the author of several books, including *A Philosophy of Boredom* (2005), *Fashion: A Philosophy* (2006), *Work* (2008), and *A Philosophy of Fear* (2008). His books have been translated into twenty-two languages.

Kerri A. Pierce is the translator of Mela Hartwig's *Am I a Redundant Human Being?* for Dalkey Archive Press. She translates from German, Danish, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Norwegian, and Swedish.



SELECTED DALKEY ARCHIVE PAPERBACKS

PETROS ABATZOGLOU, *What Does Mrs. Freeman Want?*
MICHAL AJVAZ, *The Golden Age.*
The Other City.
PIERRE ALBERT-BIROT, *Grabinoulor.*
YUZ ALESHKOVSKY, *Kangaroo.*
FELIPE ALFAU, *Chromos.*
Locos.
IVAN ÂNGELO, *The Celebration.*
The Tower of Glass.
DAVID ANTIN, *Talking.*
ANTÓNIO LOBO ANTUNES, *Knowledge of Hell.*
ALAIN ARIAS-MISSON, *Theatre of Incest.*
JOHN ASHBERY AND JAMES SCHUYLER, *A Nest of Ninnies.*
HEIMRAD BÄCKER, *transcript.*
DJUNA BARNES, *Ladies Almanack.*
Ryder.
JOHN BARTH, *LETTERS.*
Sabbatical.
DONALD BARTHELME, *The King.*
Paradise.
SVETISLAV BASARA, *Chinese Letter.*
MARK BINELLI, *Sacco and Vanzetti Must Die!*
ANDREI BITOV, *Pushkin House.*
LOUIS PAUL BOON, *Chapel Road.*
My Little War.
Summer in Termuren.
ROGER BOYLAN, *Killoyle.*
IGNÁCIO DE LOYOLA BRANDÃO, *Anonymous Celebrity.*
Teeth under the Sun.
Zero.
BONNIE BREMSER, *Troia: Mexican Memoirs.*
CHRISTINE BROOKE-ROSE, *Amalgamemnon.*
BRIGID BROPHY, *In Transit.*
MEREDITH BROSNAN, *Mr. Dynamite.*
GERALD L. BRUNS, *Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language.*
EVGENY BUNIMOVICH AND J. KATES, EDS., *Contemporary Russian Poetry: An Anthology.*
GABRIELLE BURTON, *Heartbreak Hotel.*
MICHEL BUTOR, *Degrees.*
Mobile.
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Ape.
G. CABRERA INFANTE, *Infante's Inferno.*
Three Trapped Tigers.
JULIETA CAMPOS, *The Fear of Losing Eurydice.*
ANNE CARSON, *Eros the Bittersweet.*
CAMILO JOSÉ CELA, *Christ versus Arizona.*
The Family of Pascual Duarte.
The Hive.
LOUIS-FERDINAND CÉLINE, *Castle to Castle.*
Conversations with Professor Y.
London Bridge.
Normance.
North.
Rigadoon.
HUGO CHARTERIS, *The Tide Is Right.*
JEROME CHARYN, *The Tar Baby.*
MARC CHOLODENKO, *Mordechai Schamz.*
JOSHUA COHEN, *Witz.*
EMILY HOLMES COLEMAN, *The Shutter of Snow.*
ROBERT COOVER, *A Night at the Movies.*
STANLEY CRAWFORD, *Log of the S.S. The Mrs Unguentine.*
Some Instructions to My Wife.
ROBERT CREELEY, *Collected Prose.*
RENÉ CREVEL, *Putting My Foot in It.*
RALPH CUSACK, *Cadenza.*
SUSAN DAITCH, *L.C.*
Storytown.
NICHOLAS DELBANCO, *The Count of Concord.*
NIGEL DENNIS, *Cards of Identity.*
PETER DIMOCK, *A Short Rhetoric for Leaving the Family.*
ARIEL DORFMAN, *Konfidenz.*
COLEMAN DOWELL, *The Houses of Children.*
Island People.
Too Much Flesh and Jabez.
ARKADII DRAGOMOSHCHENKO, *Dust.*
RIKKI DUCORNET, *The Complete Butcher's Tales.*
The Fountains of Neptune.
The Jade Cabinet.
The One Marvelous Thing.
Phosphor in Dreamland.
The Stain.
The Word "Desire."
WILLIAM EASTLAKE, *The Bamboo Bed.*
Castle Keep.
Lyric of the Circle Heart.
JEAN ECHENOZ, *Chopin's Move.*
STANLEY ELKIN, *A Bad Man.*
Boswell: A Modern Comedy.
Criers and Kibitzers, Kibitzers and Criers.
The Dick Gibson Show.
The Franchiser.
George Mills.
The Living End.
The MacGuffin.
The Magic Kingdom.
Mrs. Ted Bliss.
The Rabbi of Lud.
Van Gogh's Room at Arles.
ANNIE ERNAUX, *Cleaned Out.*
LAUREN FAIRBANKS, *Muzzle Thyself.*
Sister Carrie.
LESLIE A. FIEDLER, *Love and Death in the American Novel.*
JUAN FILLOY, *Op Oloop.*
GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, *Bouvard and Pécuchet.*
KASS FLEISHER, *Talking out of School.*
FORD MADOX FORD, *The March of Literature.*
JON FOSSE, *Melancholy.*
MAX FRISCH, *I'm Not Stiller.*
Man in the Holocene.
CARLOS FUENTES, *Christopher Unborn.*
Distant Relations.
Terra Nostra.
Where the Air Is Clear.

FOR A FULL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, VISIT:
www.dalkeyarchive.com

SELECTED DALKEY ARCHIVE PAPERBACKS

JANICE GALLOWAY, *Foreign Parts.*
The Trick Is to Keep Breathing.
WILLIAM H. GASS, *Cartesian Sonata and Other Novellas.*
Finding a Form.
A Temple of Texts.
The Tunnel.
Willie Masters' Lonesome Wife.
GÉRARD GAVARRY, *Hoppla! 1 2 3.*
ETIENNE GILSON,
The Arts of the Beautiful.
Forms and Substances in the Arts.
C. S. GISCOMBE, *Giscome Road.*
Here.
Prairie Style.
DOUGLAS GLOVER, *Bad News of the Heart.*
The Enamoured Knight.
WITOLD GOMBROWICZ,
A Kind of Testament.
KAREN ELIZABETH GORDON, *The Red Shoes.*
GEORGI GOSPODINOV, *Natural Novel.*
JUAN GOYTISOLO, *Count Julian.*
Juan the Landless.
Makbara.
Marks of Identity.
PATRICK GRAINVILLE, *The Cave of Heaven.*
HENRY GREEN, *Back.*
Blindness.
Concluding.
Doting.
Nothing.
JIŘÍ GRUŠA, *The Questionnaire.*
GABRIEL GUDDING,
Rhode Island Notebook.
MELA HARTWIG, *Am I a Redundant Human Being?*
JOHN HAWKES, *The Passion Artist.*
Whistlejacket.
ALEKSANDAR HEMON, ED.,
Best European Fiction 2010.
AIDAN HIGGINS, *A Bestiary.*
Balcony of Europe.
Bornholm Night-Ferry.
Darkling Plain: Texts for the Air.
Flotsam and Jetsam.
Langrishe, Go Down.
Scenes from a Receding Past.
Windy Arbours.
ALDOUS HUXLEY, *Antic Hay.*
Crome Yellow.
Point Counter Point.
Those Barren Leaves.
Time Must Have a Stop.
MIKHAIL IOSSEL AND JEFF PARKER, EDS.,
Amerika: Russian Writers View the United States.
GERT JONKE, *The Distant Sound.*
Geometric Regional Novel.
Homage to Czerny.
The System of Vienna.
JACQUES JOUET, *Mountain R.*
Savage.
CHARLES JULIET, *Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde.*
MIEKO KANAI, *The Word Book.*
HUGH KENNER, *The Counterfeiters.*
Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians.
Joyce's Voices.
DANILO KIŠ, *Garden, Ashes.*
A Tomb for Boris Davidovich.
ANITA KONKKA, *A Fool's Paradise.*
GEORGE KONRÁD, *The City Builder.*
TADEUSZ KONWICKI, *A Minor Apocalypse.*
The Polish Complex.
MENIS KOUMANDAREAS, *Koula.*
ELAINE KRAF, *The Princess of 72nd Street.*
JIM KRUSOE, *Iceland.*
EWA KURYLUK, *Century 21.*
ERIC LAURRENT, *Do Not Touch.*
VIOLETTE LEDUC, *La Bâtarde.*
SUZANNE JILL LEVINE, *The Subversive Scribe: Translating Latin American Fiction.*
DEBORAH LEVY, *Billy and Girl.*
Pillow Talk in Europe and Other Places.
JOSÉ LEZAMA LIMA, *Paradiso.*
ROSA LIKSOM, *Dark Paradise.*
OSMAN LINS, *Avalovara.*
The Queen of the Prisons of Greece.
ALF MAC LOCHLAINN,
The Corpus in the Library.
Out of Focus.
RON LOEWINSOHN, *Magnetic Field(s).*
BRIAN LYNCH, *The Winner of Sorrow.*
D. KEITH MANO, *Take Five.*
MICHELINE AHARONIAN MARCOM,
The Mirror in the Well.
BEN MARCUS,
The Age of Wire and String.
WALLACE MARKFIELD,
Teitlebaum's Window.
To an Early Grave.
DAVID MARKSON, *Reader's Block.*
Springer's Progress.
Wittgenstein's Mistress.
CAROLE MASO, *AVA.*
LADISLAV MATEJKA AND KRYSTYNA POMORSKA, EDS.,
Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views.
HARRY MATHEWS,
The Case of the Persevering Maltese: Collected Essays.
Cigarettes.
The Conversions.
The Human Country: New and Collected Stories.
The Journalist.
My Life in CIA.
Singular Pleasures.
The Sinking of the Odradek Stadium.
Tlooth.
20 Lines a Day.
ROBERT L. MCLAUGHLIN, ED.,
Innovations: An Anthology of Modern & Contemporary Fiction.
HERMAN MELVILLE, *The Confidence-Man.*
AMANDA MICHALOPOULOU, *I'd Like.*

FOR A FULL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, VISIT:
www.dalkeyarchive.com

SELECTED DALKEY ARCHIVE PAPERBACKS

STEVEN MILLHAUSER,
The Barnum Museum.
In the Penny Arcade.
RALPH J. MILLS, JR.,
Essays on Poetry.
MOMUS, *The Book of Jokes.*
CHRISTINE MONTALBETTI, *Western.*
OLIVE MOORE, *Spleen.*
NICHOLAS MOSLEY, *Accident.*
Assassins.
Catastrophe Practice.
Children of Darkness and Light.
Experience and Religion.
God's Hazard.
The Hesperides Tree.
Hopeful Monsters.
Imago Bird.
Impossible Object.
Inventing God.
Judith.
Look at the Dark.
Natalie Natalia.
Paradoxes of Peace.
Serpent.
Time at War.
The Uses of Slime Mould: Essays of Four Decades.
WARREN MOTTE,
Fables of the Novel: French Fiction since 1990.
Fiction Now: The French Novel in the 21st Century.
Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature.
YVES NAVARRE, *Our Share of Time.*
Sweet Tooth.
DOROTHY NELSON, *In Night's City.*
Tar and Feathers.
ESHKOL NEVO, *Homesick.*
WILFRIDO D. NOLLEDO,
But for the Lovers.
FLANN O'BRIEN,
At Swim-Two-Birds.
At War.
The Best of Myles.
The Dalkey Archive.
Further Cuttings.
The Hard Life.
The Poor Mouth.
The Third Policeman.
CLAUDE OLLIER, *The Mise-en-Scène.*
PATRIK OUŘEDNÍK, *Europeana.*
FERNANDO DEL PASO,
News from the Empire.
Palinuro of Mexico.
ROBERT PINGET, *The Inquisitory.*
Mahu or The Material.
Trio.
MANUEL PUIG,
Betrayed by Rita Hayworth.
The Buenos Aires Affair.
Heartbreak Tango.
RAYMOND QUENEAU, *The Last Days.*
Odile.
Pierrot Mon Ami.
Saint Glinglin.
ANN QUIN, *Berg.*
Passages.
Three.
Tripticks.
ISHMAEL REED,
The Free-Lance Pallbearers.
The Last Days of Louisiana Red.
Ishmael Reed: The Plays.
Reckless Eyeballing.
The Terrible Threes.
The Terrible Twos.
Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down.
JEAN RICARDOU, *Place Names.*
RAINER MARIA RILKE,
The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge.
JULIÁN RÍOS, *Larva: A Midsummer Night's Babel.*
Poundemonium.
AUGUSTO ROA BASTOS, *I the Supreme.*
OLIVIER ROLIN, *Hotel Crystal.*
ALIX CLEO ROUBAUD, *Alix's Journal.*
JACQUES ROUBAUD, *The Form of a City Changes Faster, Alas, Than the Human Heart.*
The Great Fire of London.
Hortense in Exile.
Hortense Is Abducted.
The Loop.
The Plurality of Worlds of Lewis.
The Princess Hoppy.
Some Thing Black.
LEON S. ROUDIEZ,
French Fiction Revisited.
VEDRANA RUDAN, *Night.*
STIG SÆTERBAKKEN, *Siamese.*
LYDIE SALVAYRE, *The Company of Ghosts.*
Everyday Life.
The Lecture.
Portrait of the Writer as a Domesticated Animal.
The Power of Flies.
LUIS RAFAEL SÁNCHEZ,
Macho Camacho's Beat.
SEVERO SARDUY, *Cobra & Maitreya.*
NATHALIE SARRAUTE,
Do You Hear Them?
Martereau.
The Planetarium.
ARNO SCHMIDT, *Collected Stories.*
Nobodaddy's Children.
CHRISTINE SCHUTT, *Nightwork.*
GAIL SCOTT, *My Paris.*
DAMION SEARLS, *What We Were Doing and Where We Were Going.*
JUNE AKERS SEESE,
Is This What Other Women Feel Too?
What Waiting Really Means.
BERNARD SHARE, *Inish.*
Transit.
AURELIE SHEEHAN,
Jack Kerouac Is Pregnant.
VIKTOR SHKLOVSKY, *Knight's Move.*
A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs 1917–1922.
Energy of Delusion: A Book on Plot.

FOR A FULL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, VISIT:
www.dalkeyarchive.com

SELECTED DALKEY ARCHIVE PAPERBACKS

Literature and Cinematography.
Theory of Prose.
Third Factory.
Zoo, or Letters Not about Love.
CLAUDE SIMON, *The Invitation.*
PIERRE SINIAC, *The Collaborators.*
JOSEF ŠKVORECKÝ, *The Engineer of Human Souls.*
GILBERT SORRENTINO,
Aberration of Starlight.
Blue Pastoral.
Crystal Vision.
Imaginative Qualities of Actual Things.
Mulligan Stew.
Pack of Lies.
Red the Fiend.
The Sky Changes.
Something Said.
Splendide-Hôtel.
Steelwork.
Under the Shadow.
W. M. SPACKMAN,
The Complete Fiction.
ANDRZEJ STASIUK, *Fado.*
GERTRUDE STEIN,
Lucy Church Amiably.
The Making of Americans.
A Novel of Thank You.
LARS SVENDSEN, *A Philosophy of Evil.*
PIOTR SZEWC, *Annihilation.*
GONÇALO M. TAVARES, *Jerusalem.*
LUCIAN DAN TEODOROVICI,
Our Circus Presents . . .
STEFAN THEMERSON, *Hobson's Island.*
The Mystery of the Sardine.
Tom Harris.
JEAN-PHILIPPE TOUSSAINT,
The Bathroom.
Camera.
Monsieur.
Running Away.
Self-Portrait Abroad.
Television.
DUMITRU TSEPENEAG,
The Necessary Marriage.
Pigeon Post.
Vain Art of the Fugue.
ESTHER TUSQUETS, *Stranded.*
DUBRAVKA UGRESIC,
Lend Me Your Character.
Thank You for Not Reading.
MATI UNT, *Brecht at Night*
Diary of a Blood Donor.
Things in the Night.
ÁLVARO URIBE AND OLIVIA SEARS, EDS.,
The Best of Contemporary Mexican Fiction.
ELOY URROZ, *The Obstacles.*
LUISA VALENZUELA, *He Who Searches.*
MARJA-LIISA VARTIO,
The Parson's Widow.
PAUL VERHAEGHEN, *Omega Minor.*
BORIS VIAN, *Heartsnatcher.*
ORNELA VORPSI, *The Country Where No One Ever Dies.*
AUSTRYN WAINHOUSE, *Hedyphagetica.*
PAUL WEST,
Words for a Deaf Daughter & Gala.
CURTIS WHITE,
America's Magic Mountain.
The Idea of Home.
Memories of My Father Watching TV.
Monstrous Possibility: An Invitation to Literary Politics.
Requiem.
DIANE WILLIAMS, *Excitability: Selected Stories.*
Romancer Erector.
DOUGLAS WOOLF, *Wall to Wall.*
Ya! & John-Juan.
JAY WRIGHT, *Polynomials and Pollen.*
The Presentable Art of Reading Absence.
PHILIP WYLIE, *Generation of Vipers.*
MARGUERITE YOUNG,
Angel in the Forest.
Miss MacIntosh, My Darling.
REYOUNG, *Unbabbling.*
ZORAN ŽIVKOVIĆ, *Hidden Camera.*
LOUIS ZUKOFSKY, *Collected Fiction.*
SCOTT ZWIREN, *God Head.*

FOR A FULL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, VISIT:
www.dalkeyarchive.com